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COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS 
Giuliano G. Castellano* & Andrea Tosato** 
 
Commercial law is not a single, monolithic entity. It has grown into a dense thicket 
of subject-specific branches that govern a broad range of transactions and 
corporate actions. When one of these events falls concurrently within the purview 
of two or more of these commercial law branches – such as corporate law, 
intellectual property law, secured transactions law, conduct and prudential 
regulation – an overlap materializes. We refer to this legal phenomenon as a 
commercial law intersection (CLI). Some notable examples of transactions that 
feature CLIs include bank loans secured by shares, supply chain financing, patent 
cross-licensing, and blockchain-based initial coin offerings.  
 
CLIs present a complex and multi-faceted challenge. The convergence of 
commercial law branches is frequently beset with failures in coordination that both 
distort incentives for market participants and increase transaction costs. Crucially, 
in the most severe cases, this affliction deters business actors from entering into the 
affected transactions altogether. The cries of scholars, judges, and practitioners 
lamenting these issues have grown ever louder yet methodical, comprehensive 
solutions remain elusive. 
 
This article endeavors to fill this void. First, it provides a comprehensive analysis 
of CLIs and their coordination failures. Drawing from systems theory and 
jurisprudence, it then identifies the deficiencies of the most common approaches 
used to reconcile tensions between commercial law branches, before advancing the 
concepts of “coherence” and “unity of purpose” as the key to addressing such 
shortcomings. Finally, it formulates a two-step interpretive method that unties the 
Gordian knot created by CLI coordination failures. 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
*   Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law; Deputy Director, Asian Institute of International Financial 
Law (AIIFL). 
** Associate Professor, University of Nottingham, School of Law; Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania, Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Commercial law is not a single, monolithic entity. Over time, it has evolved 
into a fragmented bundle of subject-specific, legal and regulatory regimes that 
govern non-consumer transactions and corporate actions.1 Some of these branches 
of commercial law stem from ancient mercantile practices, such as the law of sales, 
the law of agency, secured transactions law and corporate law.2 Others have 
emerged in recent centuries to protect intellectual property, safeguard competition 
from unreasonable trade restraints and monopolies, and maintain the safety and 
soundness of the financial system.3  
Reflecting the progressive decline of the common law, commercial law 
branches are increasingly codified in statutes and delegated administrative 
enactments.4 These sources of law are articulated in rules and principles. Rules are 
specific directives that are either prescriptive or proscriptive. Principles are general 
 
1 The idea of legal fragmentation was originally birthed in public international law 
literature; see INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
REPORT STUDY GROUP ON THE FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 10-28 (2006) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Report] (providing 
an exhaustive analysis of the notion of “fragmentation of international law”); see generally Eyal 
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Martti Koskenniemi, 
Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (2002). For its application in commercial law in the sense of sectorial 
fragmentation see generally Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit Creation: 
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2018). (focusing on 
the fragmentation of legal and regulatory regimes governing secured credit); Joshua Karton, 
Sectoral Fragmentation in Transnational Contract Law, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 142 (2018) (describing 
how commercial law has split across sectorial lines both at domestic and international level); Andrea 
Tosato, Intellectual Property License Contracts: Reflections on a Prospective UNCITRAL Project, 
86 U. CIN. L. REV. 1251 (2018) (analyzing the fragmentation of the legal framework governing IP 
licensing); Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Fragmentation of International Trade Law, 45 JOURNAL OF 
WORLD TRADE 87 (2011) (exploring the phenomenon of fragmentation in international trade law); 
ROYSTON MILES GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 3–8 (1998) (providing an 
historical account of the fragmentation of English commercial law). 
2 See infra notes 27-35 and related discussion in text. 
3 See infra notes 38-55 and related discussion in text. 
4 On the codification of commercial law see generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH ch. 1 (2018) (for an exhaustive historical analysis); 
GOODE, supra note 1, at 3–7 (charting the trajectory of this phenomenon and describing the advent 
of commercial law codifications as the “pre-eminence of dispositive law”); Karl Llewellyn, Why a 
Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779 (1951–1953) (expounding the reasons for a commercial 
code in the US); Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: 
The Progressive Development of Commercial Law In Honor of Dean Soia Mentschikoff, 37 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 351 (1982) (offering a US perspective on this phenomenon). 
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indications that set out an objective which can be legal, economic, social or even 
moral in nature.5 Through the lens of general systems theory,6 commercial law 
branches can be understood as autonomous systems of rules and principles that 
supplement and derogate general doctrines of contract, tort and restitution law, to 
realize determinate policy aims.7 
When a transaction or a corporate action falls concurrently within the 
purview of two or more commercial law branches an overlap materializes. We refer 
to this legal phenomenon as a commercial law intersection (CLI). For example, a 
transaction in which a bank extends a loan to a company and concurrently takes a 
security interest in the debtor’s shares, gives rise to a CLI between secured 
 
5 The terms “rules”, “principles” and “standards” do not have fixed and universally 
accepted meanings in scholarly literature. In this article, we use the terms “rules” and “principles” 
borrowing from the terminology adopted by John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of 
Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 47, 47–49 (2002); and Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688–90 (1976) (who speaks, on 
one hand, of “rules” and, on the other, of “standards” or “principles” or “policies”). Notably our 
definition of “rules” and “principles” are also aligned with those of “rules” and “standards” 
formulated by Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381–83 (1986); Lawrence 
A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based Systems in Corporate 
Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 1418 (2007); H. HART & A. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 155-58 (1958). Ronald Dworkin also builds his theory of adjudication 
on the concepts of “rules” and “principles”, though his definition of the latter is broader than our 
own; see RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–23 (1st ed. 1977). 
6 General systems theory seeks to elaborate principles that apply to systems in general 
irrespective of whether they are physical, biological, mathematical or sociological in nature. See 
generally Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, An Outline of General System Theory., BRITISH JOURNAL FOR 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1950) (laying the foundations for general systems theory); Id. General 
System Theory, Main Currents of Modern Thought 75-83 (1955) (framing more expansively his 
theory); ANATOL RAPOPORT, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS, 
at i (1986). (“proponents of general systems theory purport to seek integrating principles sufficiently 
general to apply to many different contexts: physical, biological, psychological and social”). 
7 The application of general system theory to legal studies has a long-standing tradition. 
Most notably, the works of Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann have been groundbreaking in 
advancing legal scholarship. See generally Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in 
AUTOPOIETIC LAW 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987); Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, 
in AUTOPOIETIC LAW 13 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (positing that law and society are composed 
of sub-systems and that communication among those is problematic); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & 
Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law Diversity or Cacophony: New Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Gunther Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to 
Blankenburg, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291 (1984) (arguing that the law is fragmented into a series of 
sub-systems engendering collisions among rules).  
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transactions law and the legal regimes regulating securities and banking activities.8 
In the past, CLIs concerned a narrow circle of market participants engaged in 
sophisticated transactions.9 However, over the past three centuries, the intensifying 
fragmentation of commercial law, coupled with the ascent of novel types of 
business interactions have caused CLIs to proliferate.10 In fact, governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, both at national and international levels, have 
emphasized that CLIs are forming across an expanding range of business sectors 
and that they affect equally small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as well as 
multinational corporations.11 
The growth of CLIs poses significant challenges. In principle, such 
convergences should generate composite regimes that synergistically enable 
persons to carry out their desired transaction. In practice, CLIs often suffer from 
failures in coordination. In some cases, the intersecting commercial law branches 
neither explicitly nor implicitly address the possibility of their overlap, spawning 
an ambiguous gap in the law that shrouds the transaction in question either partly 
or entirely. In others, the applicable rules and principles constitute an incongruous 
legal framework that is either rife with internal conflicts (antinomies) or impedes 
the achievement of the parties’ intended outcomes. 
 
8 See STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 434–43 (6th ed. 2016) (providing an exhaustive 
analysis of this overlap). 
9 This is the case, for instance, of international sales of commodities; see infra notes 62-64 
and accompanying text. 
10 On the proliferation and genesis and diffusion of transactions involving CLIs see infra 
subpart I.B. 
11 UNCITRAL, Draft Legislative Guide On Secured Transactions, 65 (2019) advanced 
copy available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/securityinterests [hereinafter UNCITRAL Practice 
Guide] (emphasizing “the need for closer coordination between the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Secured Transactions and the national prudential regulatory framework”); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 1-2, 22, 46, 53, 80 (Dec. 14, 2007), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-
10English.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Legislative Guide]; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Secured Transactions–Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property 1-3 (June 
29, 2010), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/10-
57126_Ebook_Suppl_SR_IP.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL IP Annex]; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.pdf (hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Model Law) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. WORLD BANK GROUP, KNOWLEDGE GUIDE ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, COLLATERAL REGISTRIES AND MOVABLE ASSET-BASED FINANCING 4 
(2019) (technical contents prepared by Marek Dubovec and Giuliano G. Castellano) [hereinafter 
WBG Knowledge Guide] (indicating the need for coordination between legal and regulatory 
regimes to promote financial inclusion). 
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Gaps and incongruences are not uncommon in the law. Their presence in 
CLIs should not be deemed fatal. Indeed, legal scholars have long recognized that 
varying degrees of vagueness pervade most legal frameworks.12 Coextensively, 
considerations over the “optimal precision” of rules permeate the entire spectrum 
of law-making. Seeking a balance between transparency, accessibility, and 
congruence is paramount to design rules which are clear, flexible, and aligned with 
overarching policy objectives.13 For instance, the debates concerning the adoption 
of principle-based or rule-based approaches to regulate  technological 
advancements in finance (FinTech) echo a deeper struggle to find equilibrium 
between financial innovation and the safety, soundness, and integrity of markets.14 
Crucially, the particular gaps and incongruences that beset CLIs are 
problematic because they have far-reaching negative consequences. Albeit with 
scalar intensity, CLI coordination failures foist upon market participants an 
inadequate and perilous legal infrastructure, as opposed to a flexible framework; 
the applicable regime is either difficult to understand and operate or riddled with 
uncertainty regarding its outcomes. In all these cases, there is a distortion of 
incentives for the parties involved and, ultimately, an increase in transaction costs. 
In the most severe cases, CLI coordination failures have a chilling effect which 
deters the parties from entering into the affected transactions altogether. Notably, 
 
12 Vagueness in law is a topic that has fascinated legal scholars across numerous 
generations. An exhaustive exploration of this notion lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry; 
see generally TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (1 edition ed. 2001); Jeremy Waldron, 
Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues Symposium: Void for Vagueness, 82 
CAL L. REV. 509 (1994). For a collection of valuable attempts to link legal with philosophical 
thinking about vagueness, see Symposium, Vagueness and Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 369 (2001). 
13 A seminal contribution to this debate was offered by Professor Colin Diver who noted 
that the design of administrative rules requires to consider a set of key tradeoffs between 
“transparency” (i.e., the clarity of the words used), “accessibility” (i.e., the ability to be applied to a 
variety of practical situations); and “congruence” (i.e., the alignment with the policy aims it intends 
to achieve); see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 
(1983). Identifying an equilibrium between determinacy and flexibility of rules is a 
multidimensional issue that is echoed in the debates concerning the aptness of general principles 
and detailed rules to achieve policy aims; see, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative 
Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853 
(1999) (focusing on environmental law issues and proposing to implement rules with a lower level 
of detail in order to achieve policy aims). 
14 Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1311–13 (2016). (noting that principle-based regulation, while providing for 
more flexibility, might lack of sufficient clarity, whereas rule-based regulation might bolster 
investors’ confidence towards nascent FinTech companies). See also generally Chris Brummer & 
Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019) (noting the tension 
between regulatory clarity and flexibility). 
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scholars, judges, practitioners and a comprehensive cohort of sectorial, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations have repeatedly sounded the 
alarm about these issues.15 Nevertheless, principled and systematic solutions have 
not been forthcoming. 
This article endeavors to fill this void, by formulating a method to address 
CLI coordination failures. 
As a preliminary step, we investigate whether interpretive approaches that 
are commonly used to overcome gaps and incongruences in the law offer useful 
tools to tackle CLI coordination failures.16 The focus of this analysis concentrates 
on hermeneutical canons designed to achieve consistency between multiple legal 
regimes, such as lex specialis and lex superior. Upon close scrutiny, they all share 
a common shortcoming. Their application leads to one of the intersecting branches 
bluntly prevailing over the others in the CLI. Such an approach does not integrate 
harmoniously the applicable provisions of the intersecting branches, rather it 
spawns a markedly lopsided regime that exacerbates coordination failures and their 
negative consequences.  
Having identified the weaknesses of orthodox interpretive approaches, we 
advance the view that “coherence” is the key notion to address CLI coordination 
 
15 Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the need for a better coordination between 
branches of commercial law; see generally Catherine Walsh, The Role of Party Autonomy in 
Determining the Third-Party Effects of Assignments: Of “Secret Laws” and “Secret Liens,” 81 LAW 
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 181 (2018) (emphasizing the need for coordination across 
commercial branches to expand access to credit); Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Global 
Regulatory Standards and Secured Transactions Law Reforms: At the Crossroad between Access to 
Credit and Financial Stability, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 531 (2018) (focusing on the intersection 
between secured transactions law and prudential regulation); Cunningham, supra note 5 
(denouncing the complexities of the intersections of corporate law, securities regulation, and 
accounting). International organizations have indicated coordination issues as problematic; see, e.g., 
the UNCITRAL Practice Guide supra note 11 at 9 (indicating that the applicability of secured 
transactions law in a given legal system might be restricted by other laws); WBG Knowledge Guide 
supra note 11 at 35, referring to Castellano & Dubovec, supra. (indicating that the “lack of 
coordination between […]  areas of law could hinder both access to credit and financial stability.”).   
16 Though some commentators have drawn a distinction between the notions of 
“construing” and “interpreting” the law, in this article we treat the two as coextensive. On 
interpretive methods to address gaps and incongruences see generally AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE 
INTERPRETATION IN LAW 61–83 (2005); EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 
263–71 (1940); OLIVER JONES, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ch. 12–15 (7th ed. 2019); 
RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48–69 (3rd Revised ed. edition ed. 1995); FRANCIS 
A. BENNION, UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW LEGISLATION: DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION 41–
54 (2009); SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 36, 37, 40 (Norman J. Singer 
& J. D. Shambie Singer eds., 2019). 
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failures.17 Drawing from legal theory and philosophy of mathematics, we propose 
that the rules and principles forming a CLI should be construed to be 
simultaneously consistent with each other and their appertaining commercial law 
branches, and that such consistency should be achieved through a “unity of 
purpose”.18 To this end, we argue that such unity of purpose should be understood 
as the underlying socio-economic policies and political objectives that the CLI in 
question is intended to achieve. Moreover, in line with an ample body of 
jurisprudence theories, we posit that it should be extrapolated from a combined 
assessment of textual and contextual elements. 
Building on this theoretical framework, we formulate a two-step method to 
address CLI coordination failures. The first step is deconstructive in nature. It 
involves identifying precisely the rules and principles that engender the CLI 
coordination failure under consideration, then appraising their systemic relevance 
within their appertaining commercial law branch. For this assessment, we propose 
a systemization that visualizes commercial law branches as tripartite spherical 
structures, comprised of a core, a middle sphere and an outer sphere. We posit that 
each rule and principle of a commercial law branch can be placed within one of 
these three concentric spheres, in decreasing order of systemic relevance from the 
core to the outer sphere. The second step focuses on fostering coherence. We 
propose that, having established whether the rules and principles entangled in a CLI 
are related to the core, middle, or outer sphere of their respective branches, one 
must tailor the approach to resolution accordingly. Our analysis shows that 
instances which involve the core of one of the intersecting branches tend to require 
nuanced normative assessments. By contrast, coordination failures that only touch 
 
17 The body of scholarship exploring the notion of coherence is vast. See generally Jaap 
Hage, Law and Coherence, 17 RATIO JURIS 87 (2004); Stefano Bertea, The Arguments from 
Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (2005); Veronica Rodriguez-
Blanco, A Revision of the Constitutive and Epistemic Coherence Theories in Law, 14 RATIO JURIS 
212 (2001); Aldo Schiavello, On Coherence and Law: An Analysis of Different Models, 14 RATIO 
JURIS 233 (2001); Aleksander Peczenik, Law, Morality, Coherence and Truth, 7 RATIO JURIS 146 
(1994); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1992); Susan L. Hurley, 
Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221 (1990); Robert 
Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive 
Rationality, 3 RATIO JURIS 130 (1990); Neil MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in 
THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 235 (Aleksander Peczenik et al. eds., 1984); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal 
Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order 
of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1984); AULIS AARNIO, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1983). 
18 See MacCormick, supra note 17; Raz, supra note 17. (who speaks of “unity of 
principle”). See infra subpart II.B. 
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upon the middle and outer sphere of the intersecting branches present a path to legal 
coherence that is not as tortuous. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we describe the socio-
economic factors that fueled the inception and rise of CLIs. This is followed by a 
systematic assessment of both the coordination failures that frequently surface 
when commercial law branches overlap, and the ensuing negative consequences for 
market participants. In Part II, we show that the gaps and incongruences that vex 
CLIs cannot be overcome by relying on interpretive methods that simplistically 
favor one of the intersecting branches over the other. We suggest instead that an 
approach centered on the notion of legal coherence is required. In Part III, we 
present our method for addressing CLI coordination failures. We expound the 
assessments to be conducted, the factors to be weighed and the range of possible 
interventions that pave the path to attaining legal coherence. 
 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS (CLIS) 
The global economic landscape has developed at an unprecedented pace 
over the past three centuries. The first, second, third and fourth industrial 
revolutions have reshaped the factors of production and dynamics of 
consumption.19 An ever-expanding cohort of participants are engaged in the 
demand or supply side of markets that are increasingly international, 
interconnected, and competitive.20 Coextensively, standardized, depersonalized, 
multipartite dealings have soared in number and relevance, facilitated by the advent 
of digitization, automation, data availability, and real-time processing 
capabilities.21 
 
19 See generally KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2017) (positing 
that the first industrial revolution (1760-1840) was characterized by the advent of the steam engines 
and rail roads. The second (late 19th century-early 20th century) by mass production and 
electrification. The third (1960-1999) by semiconductors, mainframes, personal computing and the 
internet. The fourth (2000-present) by mobile internet, sensors, actuators, machine learning and 
artificial intelligence). 
20 See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005) (theorizing that 
globalization has opened markets to large segments of the world population who previously had no 
such access markedly and, in turn, levelled the competitive playing field); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED: ANTI-GLOBALIZATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP 
(2017) (describing the dislocations and displacements caused by globalization, standardization, 
digitization and automation, and analyzing their negative effects on determinate segments of 
society).  
21 See generally PATRICK SELIM ATIYAH, 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
(1979) (for an historical account of the effect of these socio-economic developments on the cardinal 
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Confronted with novel business organizations, activities, interactions and 
unprecedented capital flows, commercial law has responded by progressively 
splintering into subject-specific branches.22 However, the gradual proliferation of 
multi-faceted transactions that touch upon diverse aspects of commercial law has 
caused overlaps between these co-existing regimes. On occasion, these 
convergences have produced harmonious coalescences that both facilitate 
voluntary exchanges and the efficient allocation of capital. With increasing 
frequency, however, they have been hindered by failures in coordination of varying 
severity.23  
This part begins by providing a narrative account of the process of 
fragmentation of commercial law and the multiplication of its constituent strands. 
Thereafter, it expounds the dynamics that have led commercial law branches to 
increasingly cross paths and, in turn, give rise to growing numbers of CLIs. This is 
followed by an analysis of both the coordination failures that often beset these 
intersections and their negative consequences.  
 
A. The Fragmentation of Commercial Law 
Commercial law has become increasingly fragmented over the past three 
centuries.24 At the domestic level, this phenomenon has been evidenced by the 
inexorable specialization of legal professionals and adjudicators, as well as the 
increasing recourse to legal codification and delegated rulemaking.25 At the 
international level, it has been reflected in the rise of subject-specific multilateral 
treaties and soft law instruments that, while promoting legal harmonization, have 
 
common law doctrines governing commercial contracts). Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (analyzing the rise 
of consumer contracts of adhesion); David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1395 (2018) (exploring the impact that these developments have had in consumer 
contracts, analyzing “precatory terms” and the theorizing the emergence of “relational contracts of 
adhesion”); HEIN KÖTZ, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 1–17 (2017) (highlighting these changes and 
emphasizing the progressively harmonized response of continental European contract law). 
22 See infra subpart I.A. 
23 See infra subpart I.B. 
24 See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 1 (on the notion of 
fragmentation of the law); Karton, supra note 1 (on the fragmentation of commercial law along 
sectorial lines); Delimatsis, supra note 1 (on the fragmentation of international trade law). 
25 See generally GOODE, supra note 1 (charting the trajectory of this phenomenon and 
describing the advent of commercial law codifications as the “pre-eminence of dispositive law”); 
Bane, supra note 4 (offering a US perspective on this phenomenon). 
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entrenched sectorial compartmentalization.26 Globally, this fragmentation has 
advanced along two axes.  
First, ancient regimes of commercial law have been compelled to renovate 
and evolve to keep pace with novel demands of economic actors. For example, the 
law of sales ventured beyond its Roman law and medieval core to accommodate 
the 18th century expansion in maritime and fluvial trade;27 incrementally, rules for 
executory agreements, implied warranties, and bona fide purchasers were forged, 
alongside interim remedies and market-based criteria for the quantification of 
expectation interest damages.28 More recently, at a domestic level, laws of sale have 
had to grapple with bulk sales, electronic contracting and goods with embedded 
software;29 internationally, the acceleration of global trade has led to a unified legal 
framework for cross-border sales through binding multilateral treaties.30 
In similar vein, secured transactions law has undergone deep 
transformations to accommodate the ingenuity of credit markets. Ancient 
 
26 See generally 9 PHILIP R. WOOD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
(2019); JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, 
FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW (7 edition ed. 2019); ROY M. GOODE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS (2018) (for comprehensive account 
of this phenomenon); ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (2012) (providing an encyclopedic overview of transnational 
commercial law instruments); BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, 
CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 2019) (for a North American perspective). 
27 See generally JOHN BARON MOYLE, THE CONTRACT OF SALE IN THE CIVIL LAW (1892) 
(for an exhaustive comparison of 18th century sales laws in England, France and Scotland).  
28 This is not to suggest that many of these features did not exist in previous centuries, 
rather that they became prominent with first industrial revolution. See generally PATRICK SELIM 
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical 
Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974) (arguing that the socio-
economic impact of the first industrial drove jurists to attack equitable conceptions of exchange as 
inimical to emerging contract principles such as expectation damages); A.W.B. Simpson, The 
Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979). (criticizing Horowitz’s 
thesis and suggesting that the transformation process of commercial contracts had deeper roots). 
29 The history of the attempted revisions to U.C.C. Article 2 bear witness to these 
challenges; see Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches Symposium: 
Perspectives on the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607 (2001). (describing the 
reasons underlying attempts to revise U.C.C. Article 2); Henry Gabriel, Uniform Commercial Code 
Article Two Revisions: The View of the Trenches, 23 BARRY L. REV. 129 (2018) (examining 
attempts to revise U.C.C. Article 2 between 1999-2003).  
30 See generally HENRY D. GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A 
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2009) (for a US perspective); Larry A. 
DiMatteo, The Curious Case of Transborder Sales Law: A Comparative Analysis of CESL, CISG, 
and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICATION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW 
COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW, 25-57 (Magnus Ulrich ed., 2012) (providing a comparative 
analysis of the CISG, CESL and the UCC). 
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possessory security devices, such as pledges and liens,31 have given way to non-
possessory interests recorded in public registries.32 Concurrently, floating liens 
have become common practice, effacing historically-entrenched opposition.33  
Furthermore, both domestically and internationally, this branch of commercial law 
has moved away from its traditional arrangement into distinct security devices, 
veering towards a functional approach that treats all contractually-created rights in 
personal property homogenously for the purpose of securing an obligation 
uniformly.34  
In corporate law, the balance between the interests of managers, 
shareholders, and a variety of stakeholders has profoundly changed over the past 
three centuries.35 The burgeoning involvement of institutional investors in 
 
31 See John H. Wigmore, Pledge-Idea a Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 389, 401–5 (1897) (analyzing the idea of pledge in the Pentateuch, the Mishna and the 
Ghemara); FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 400–427 (1951) (for an analysis of consensual 
secured transactions in classical Roman law); Roger J. Goebel, Reconstructing the Roman Law of 
Real Security, 36 TUL. L. REV. 29 (1961) (offering comprehensive history of the evolution of Roman 
secured transactions law). 
32 See generally George Lee Jr. Flint & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History: 
The First Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403 
(2004) (charting the history of non-possessory security interests in US law); GRANT GILMORE, 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 5–250 (1965).GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 5–250 (1965) (for an historical account of US secured 
transactions law prior to U.C.C. Article 9). 
33 See GILMORE, supra note 32, at 354–65 (charting the history of floating liens in the US 
and explaining their treatment under U.C.C. Article 9); Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Priorities among Secured Creditors and the “Floating Lien,” 72 HARV. L. REV. 
838 (1959) (explicating the treatment of floating liens under U.C.C. Article 9). 
34 At the international level, the preeminent examples of this shift is provided by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the ORG. OF AM. STATES (OAS), MODEL INTER-AMERICAN LAW ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2002), 
https://www.oas.org/dil/Model_Law_on_Secured_Transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YG5-P37J]. 
At the domestic level see Giuliano G. Castellano & Andrea Tosato, Personal Property Security 
Law: International Ambitions And National Realities, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 283 (Lucio 
Ghia ed., 2d ed. 2019) (for the Italian legal framework); Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell & 
Jorge Feliu Rey, Modernisation of the Law of Secured Transactions in Spain, in SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM 417 (Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) (for the Spanish legal 
framework); Moritz Brinkmann, The Peculiar Approach of German Law in the Field of Secured 
Transactions and Why It Has Worked (So Far), in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM 339 
(Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) (for the German legal framework); LOUISE GULLIFER, 
GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY, at (for the English legal framework) (6th 
ed. 2018); MAREK DUBOVEC & LOUISE GULLIFER, SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM IN 
AFRICA (2019) (for an overview of African jurisdictions). 
35 For an historical analysis of the evolution of corporate law and the main drivers for 
change see generally P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. 
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ownership structures as well as in the decisioning-making processes of modern 
corporations, has contributed to a shift in their governance.36 Corporate failures, the 
credit crunch of 2007-2008, the global financial crisis of 2009, the European debt 
crisis of 2011-2012 as well as a widespread demand for greater accountability of 
large private entities have spawned, inter alia, legal and regulatory interventions to 
pierce the corporate veil.37 The result has been a reconfiguration of the reach and 
applicability of corporate law.  
Second, commercial law has expanded to regulate segments of the business 
world that either did not exist previously or did not warrant special legislation. For 
example, in the 18th century, print commerce and steam-powered mechanization 
spurred the seminal enactment of statutes that conceptualized copyright and patents 
as personal proprietary rights.38 A hundred years later, the expansion of consumer 
markets propelled the adoption of the legal framework for registered trademarks to 
eradicate the use of confusing trade signs among competitors.39 Over time, IP law 
has shown creativity and adaptability in response to electrification, electronics, 
 
J. LEGAL HIST. 237 (2008); Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Implications for 
the Twenty-First Century, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff 
Solomon & Thomas S. Randall eds., 2019). (noting that corporate law has progressively acquired 
different attitudes towards key aspects of the life of an incorporated entity, such as its legal 
personality and autonomy). 
36 See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
263, 263–65 (2019). (arguing that “the transformation equity markets from retail to institutional 
ownership has relocated control over corporations from courts to markets and has led to the death 
of corporate law”); Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders, 103 MINN. L. REV. 587 (2018). 
(highlighting the significance of institutional shareholders in bank governance as a source of 
“private monitoring”); Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary 
Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014). (noting that voting behavior of institutional 
shareholders has been influenced by regulatory changes requiring them to cast their votes in the best 
interests of stakeholders).   
37 This point, for instance, emerges from the rebuttal of the principle of “shareholders 
supremacy” replaced by the “stakeholders supremacy” in the context of regulated financial 
institutions; see infra note 200. 
38 A vast body of scholarship expounds the causal link between technological innovation 
and modern copyright and patents law. See generally Joanna Kostylo, From Gunpowder to Print: 
The Common Origins of Copyright and Patent, in LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY 
21 (2010). Specifically on copyright, see generally Oren Bracha, United States Copyright, 1672-
1909, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 335 (Isabella Alexander & 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) (for the history of US copyright protection). For patents, 
see generally Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2000). 
39 See generally Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: The Contruction 
of the Legal Concept of Trade Mark (1860-1880), in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS 3 (Lionel Bently 
et al. eds., 2008) (charing the rise of modern trademarks law). 
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communications networks and digitization.40 Concurrently, from the late 19th 
century, the intensity in cross-border trade of IP products has fueled the creation 
and expansion of a framework of international conventions for copyrights, patents 
and trademarks.41  
In similar vein, at the sunset of the 19th century, modern antitrust law 
emerged to subdue trust, pools and other concentrations,42 in both Canada43 and the 
United States.44 In the 20th century, shepherded by successive economic theories,45 
this branch of commercial law crafted substantive and procedural tools to safeguard 
“the competitive process”46 from anticompetitive vertical and horizontal 
agreements, and monopolistic practices.47 In the 21st century, antitrust legislation 
 
40 See generally Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. 
eds., 1993). 
41 For a comprehensive overview of these international instruments and an exhaustive 
bibliography, see generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2019). 
42 From the 17th century, Anglo-American common law developed rules that voided 
restraint of trade contracts on public policy grounds, if they unreasonably constrained a person’s 
freedom to exercise their profession, see 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
56 (2d ed.1937). These doctrines lay the groundwork for subsequent Canadian and US antitrust 
laws, see generally Brian Cheffins, The Development of Competition Policy, 1890-1940: A Re-
Evaluation of a Canadian and American Tradition, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 449 (1989); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 
(1989). 
43  An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of 
Trade, S.C. 1889, ch. 41 (Can.); see generally Michael Bliss, Another Anti-Trust Tradition: 
Canadian Anti-Combines Policy, 1889-1910, 47 THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, 177 (1973); 
Jamie Benidickson, The Combines Problem in Canadian Legal Thought, 1867-1920, 43 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 799, 850 (1993). 
44 See An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and 
Monopolies, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2019)); see 
Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective, in OXFORD 
RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY (2019) (for an historical overview of the 
evolution of antitrust law in the United States). 
45 See generally RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, 
RHETORIC, LAW (2001) (offering a chronological analysis of the successive political and economic 
theories that have influenced US antitrust law); ALISON JONES ET AL., EU COMPETITION LAW 13–
76 (7th ed. 2019) (on the policies and theories underlying EU competition law). 
46 David J. Gerber, Competition Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2005) (using this expression to describe broadly 
the combined subject matter of north American antitrust law and EU competition law). 
47 See generally RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed., 2001); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST (2017); JONES ET AL., supra note 45, at 13–76. 
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has spread globally, yet continues to lack a unitary international framework, thus 
remaining an interrelated set of heterogenous domestic laws.48 
Over the course of the past century, the previously-described changes to 
corporate law were matched by the exponential growth of financial regulation. The 
divide between the banking, insurance, and investment sectors faded, requiring 
regulatory and supervisory coordination. Subsequently, the financial and corporate 
crises of the 21st century defined the global regulatory agenda, leading to an ulterior 
expansion of the role attributed to administrative agencies in the governance of 
financial markets.49 At present, financial regulation comprises an heterogenous set 
of special rules and principles divided into conduct of businesses regulation 
(conduct regulation)50 and prudential regulation.51 Conduct regulation is chiefly 
concerned with both protecting market integrity and fostering an ethical business 
culture, generally referred to as a “culture of compliance”.52 Prudential regulation 
encompasses a variety of regimes, broadly categorized in micro- and macro-
prudential regulation.53 Micro-prudential regulation is concerned with the solvency 
 
48 See generally DAVID GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW MARKETS AND 
GLOBALIZATION 119 (2010); Anu Bradford et al., Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the 
Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 411 (2019). 
49 For instance, by the Dodd-Frank Act that established a new administrative agency – the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council – to protect the stability of the financial system; see the Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203 (H.R. 4173) [hereinafter the 
Dodd-Frank Act]; see also infra note 174.  
50 See generally Andrew Tuch, Conduct of Business Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 538 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015) (offering a 
definition of conduct regulations and charting both its emergence and expansion). 
51 On the definition prudential regulation see and ROSS CRANSTON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
BANKING LAW 31 (3rd ed. 2018). (noting that “prudential regulation has undergone seismic changes 
in the post-2008 period, at least in the U.S.A., E.U., and the U.K., as a result of the crisis.”). 
52 The former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York noted that “[c]ulture 
relates to the implicit norms that guide behavior in the absence of regulations or compliance rules—
and sometimes despite those explicit restraints;” see William Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability 
by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Speech, 20 October 2014) 
<http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Dudley-Enhancing-Financial-Stability-by-Improving-
Culture-in-the-Financial-Services-Industry.pdf>. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has made 
ethics a component of its regulatory framework; see Financial Stability Board (FSB), Guidance on 
Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture: A Framework for Assessing 
Risk Culture 1 (Financial Stability Board), Apr. 7, 2014, at 1. 
53 In a famous speech delivered while he was serving as the General Manger of the Bank 
for International Settlements and Chairman of the hitherto Financial Stability Forum, Andrew 
Crockett noted that “the macro-prudential dimension focuses on the risk of correlated failures,” 
whereas “[t]he micro-prudential dimension […] considers each institution in its own right, is thus 
not concerned with correlations per se;” Andrew D. Crockett, Marrying the Micro- and Macro-
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of individual financial firms; its implementation for national banks is mandated to 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).54 Macro-prudential 
regulation aims to maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole, thus 
curbing systemic risk.55  
The preceding discourse has shown that the fragmentation of commercial 
law has progressively spawned a multiplicity of distinct regimes. Even though they 
stem from shared legal roots, they have flourished independently into separate 
branches of commercial law. Each branch, in turn, constitutes an autonomous 
system of rules and principles characterized by an internal logic that ensures its 
continuity and development over time. Albeit to a varying degree, such systems are 
both self-contained56 and self-referential.57 They are self-contained in the sense that 
 
prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability, Eleventh International Conference of Banking 
Supervisors (Basel, 20-21 September 2000), available at 
<https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp000921.htm> (accessed February 2020). 
54 The OCC is also tasked to supervise the implementation of conduct regulation. For an 
overview of the supervisory framework for national banks; see HAL SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION, at 286 et seq. (2018); 
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 92–93 (Aspen Casebook 
Series, Sixth ed. ed. 2017). The idea of separating conduct and prudential regulation – thus adopting 
a regulatory design that is similar to the one adopted in other jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom – has been advanced in various instances; see generally THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008). 
55 On the regulatory challenges posed by systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic 
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (noting that systemic risk arises from a “tragedy of the commons” 
demanding specific regulatory interventions); and Steven L. Schwarcz & Iman Anabtawi, 
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1351 
(2011) (arguing for a regulatory approach that addresses systemic risk by reducing complexity in 
the financial system). 
56 The notion of “self-contained regime” has its roots in international law; see Martti 
Koskenniemi, Study on the Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of ‘Self-
Contained Regimes’, UN Doc. ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1/Add.1, paras 314-330 (2004); 
Koskenniemi Report supra note 1 paras 123-137 (expounding the multifarious meanings which the 
notion of “self-contained regime” has assumed in international public law). Among international 
law scholars, this notion has spawned a contentious debate regarding whether a system of rules can 
ever be completely severed from general law; see Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and 
the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT. LAW 483 (2006) 
(describing this debate).  
57 The notion of a “self-referential” system has roots both in biology of cognition and social 
systems theory; see HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND 
COGNITION: THE REALIZATION OF THE LIVING (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 
42, 1980) (proposing that self-referentiality is the quality of a system to build for itself the 
components of which it consists); 2 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, 49–54 (1 edition ed. 
2012) (Eng. Translation) (theorizing that a system is self-referential if it “itself constitutes the 
elements that compose it as functional unities”); Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra 
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they establish a special regime for the dealings and activities within their remit; 
they produce outcomes that differ from those that would otherwise flow from 
general law doctrines.58 They are self-referential in that they address gaps and 
incongruences pursuant to a logic that almost exclusively references inwardly their 
own endogenous rules and principles rather than exogenous legal elements.59 
Therefore, commercial law branches may be described as autonomous 
systems of rules and logical deductions that are exceptional in nature. They 
supplement or derogate general doctrines of laws of contract, tort and restitution or 
those of another commercial law branch. Financial regulation offers a lucid 
example of these features. Rights and obligations between financial institutions and 
their customers are largely grounded in deeply-rooted common law doctrines, 
further supplemented by corporate law statutes and ad hoc regulatory provisions. 
In the banking context, banks and depositors operate within a debtor-creditor 
framework.60 Yet, financial regulation subjects banks to a special regime that 
differs from that applicable to other corporate debtors, requiring them to prioritize 
the interests of depositors over those of shareholders and enact special risk-
management processes.61 
 
B.  The Birth and Proliferation of Commercial Law Intersections  
A CLI arises from the partial overlap of two or more commercial law 
branches. This occurs when a transaction possesses traits and attributes that fall 
concurrently within the purview of several commercial law branches. The coming 
into contact of distinct self-contained systems generates a new system of rules and 
logical deductions. Its scope is narrower than that of either converging branch, and 
its span is limited to the extent of their overlap. Its function is to provide commercial 
actors with a legal regime that enables them to carry out the transaction in question 
according to their idiosyncratic preferences. 
 
note 7, at 293–95 (building on Luhmann’s theory and emphasizing the circular relationship between 
legal decisions and normative rules).   
58 We do not intend to suggest that commercial branches exist in isolation and are 
disconnected from general law, rather we emphasize that they supplement and derogate general 
doctrines of contract, tort and restitution. Consistently with international law scholars and legal 
philosophers, we recognize that special regimes can never be entirely severed from general law; see 
Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 56 (cogently arguing that no system can be completely severed 
from general law).  
59 See Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra note 7, at 295–96. 
60 See infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra subsection III.A.2.  
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CLIs have evolved and multiplied in lockstep with the fragmentation of 
commercial law. In the 19th century, transactions giving rise to CLIs were few, only 
concerned sophisticated parties, and were relatively uncomplicated. Notable 
examples were international sales of commodities – both “cost, insurance, freight” 
(CIF)62 and “free on board” (FOB)63 – in which the laws of sales, insurance and 
maritime transportation converged at numerous junctures.64  From the 20th century, 
dealings of this nature have multiplied and their complexity has augmented. For 
instance, multinational entities have increasingly chosen to operate through joint-
ventures or subsidiaries enjoined by a nexus of contracts that create intersections 
among corporate, agency IP and, often, antitrust laws.65 Similarly, in a global 
economy, the financing of supply chains has become increasingly reliant on 
dealings that entwine the laws of sales, insurance and multi-modal transportation 
with, inter alia, the laws of international trade, banking, secured transactions and 
factoring.66 
Moreover, CLIs have come to involve market participants of all guises 
rather than remaining the exclusive domain of sophisticated actors. Credit dealings 
 
62 Legal historians identify Tregelles v Sewell 7 H & N 574, 158 ER 600 (1862) as the first 
reported cases involving an international CIF transaction; see Edward A.Jr. Craighill, Sales of Goods 
on C I F Terms, 6 VA. L. REV. 229 (1919–1920) (charting the history of C.I.F. contracts in US law). 
63 For the modern legislative definition of FOB contracts, see U.C.C. § 2-319. The first 
reported case of an FOB sale is Wackerbath v. Mason 3 camp 270 (1812); see Ademuni-Odeke, 
Insurance of F.O.B. Contracts in Anglo-American and Common Law Jurisdictions Revisited: The 
Wider Picture, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 425, 430–32 (2007) (charting the history of FOB contracts). 
64 For the modern legislative definition of CIF contracts, see U.C.C. §§ 2-320-2-321. In a 
CIF transactions, a seller agrees deliver the goods to a carrier, to arrange for their transportation, to 
take the customary insurance on them for the buyer's benefit against the risks of the voyage, to 
prepay or credit the freight, and to tender the shipping documents to the buyer. The buyer agrees to 
pay the purchase price upon presentation of the shipping documents; see Philip W. Thayer, C.I.F. 
Contracts in International Commerce, 53 HARV. L. REV. 792 (1940) (analyzing C.I.F. contracts and 
emphasizing the intersection betwee the laws of sales, insurance, maritime transport and payments). 
65 For an overview of these CLIs see RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 865–1082 (13 edition ed. 2019); DETLEV 
VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 257–493 (6 edition ed. 2019). 
66 For example, see Boris Kozolchyk, Supply Chain Financing, Straight Bills of Lading 
and Standby Letters of Credit, 2 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 100, 118–22 (2010) (expounding the 
issues presented by straight bills of lading in supply chaing financing and exploring the interesection 
between U.C.C. Articles 5 and 9, and banking law); Basu A. Bal, Can UNCITRAL Instruments 
Advance Supply Chain Finance to Benefit Small and Medium Enterprises? in MODERNIZING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 156-166 
(2017) https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/17-
06783_ebook.pdf (exploring the intersection between the laws governing electronic transferable 
records, carriage of goods at sea, and secured transactions law); EUROPEAN BANKING ASSOCIATION, 
SUPPLY CHAIN FINANCE 44-66 (2014) (mapping the commercial law overlaps that arise in  
“receivable finance” and “inventory finance”). 
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designed to facilitate inclusive access to finance for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), individuals, and start-ups increasingly feature the convergence of many 
branches of commercial law. For example, SMEs operating in the agricultural 
sector – both in developed and developing economies – increasingly rely on 
warehouse receipts financing. In these transactions, individual farmers and 
cooperatives obtain working capital from financial institutions by offering 
warehouse receipts as collateral to secure their repayment obligations;67 in these 
dealings multiple intersections occur between the laws of agency, negotiable 
documents of title, insurance, secured transactions and financial regulation. 
Concurrently, intensified efforts to regulate the finance sector have further 
increased the frequency of CLIs. The involvement of financial institutions and 
activities that are regulated necessarily implies the emergence of a CLI in which 
aspects traditionally governed under commercial law intersect with rules and 
principles concerned with regulated firms and activities. Conduct regulation, for 
instance, regulates the behaviors of financial institutions towards the public in order 
to advert the risk of misconducts that could hinder the functioning (and, thus, the 
confidence in) the financial system.68 These rules stem from the need to protect 
public interests and are codified in a variety of provisions, including those designed 
to combat money laundering activities,69 limit fraudulent practices and other 
attempts to manipulate markets.70 Licensing requirements and product approval 
procedures are also part of the wide spectrum of rules defining conduct regulation; 
their implementation necessitates coordination with the corporate and contractual 
 
67 See Marek Dubovec & Adalberto Elias, A Proposal for UNCITRAL to Develop a Model 
Law on Warehouse Receipts, 22 UNIF LAW REV 716 (2017) (highlighting commercial law branches 
overlaps in warehouse receipts financing transactions and suggesting the need for an international 
soft-law instrument to promote modernization and harmonization).  
68 By and large, conduct of business regulation reflects the policy objective of protecting 
market integrity and is concerned with how firms operate their businesses; see infra note 171; see 
also JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 63 (2016). (indicating 
“[f]unctionally, they can be thought of as mandatory terms of the contractual relationship between 
the client and the intermediary, responding to agency costs”.).  
69 In the U.S. the core statute setting anti-money laundering rules is the Bank Secrecy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-4 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 
18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act]; with the amendments introduced by the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act); Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 298-320 
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act]. 
70 On the different practices used to manipulate markets see David C. Donald, Regulating 
Market Manipulation through an Understanding of Price Creation, 6 NTU L. REV. 55, 70–71 
(2011) (noting that in trade-based manipulative conduct “[i]ntegrity is challenged by trades that, in 
the context of a given market structure and a given market atmosphere, put pressure on the price 
creation process without any relationship to quality”). 
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dimension of business transactions.71 Furthermore, the intersection between 
administrative law provisions and corporate governance is epitomized by the 
regimes imposing limits to compensation for executive officers.72 In this context, 
financial institutions are deemed to live an “era of regulatory compliance”, in which 
regulatory requirements complement, or supplant, corporate law precepts.73  
International organizations have implicitly recognized the strategic 
relevance of CLIs in the pursuit of development policies. Both the UN Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank Group have 
emphasized that the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals74 
necessitates law reforms which ensure the seamless and synergetic confluence of 
different commercial law branches.75 Emblematically, the UNCITRAL Practice 
Guide to the Model Law on Secured Transactions has noted that coordination 
between contract law, property law, intellectual property law, negotiable 
instruments law, insolvency law, civil procedure law and secured transactions law 
is of critical importance to an inclusive regime for access to credit.76 In addition, 
the same instrument features a chapter devoted to assisting regulated financial 
institutions in the coordination of secured transactions law and prudential 
regulation.77 
 
 
71 These set of rules are commonly known as “entry regulation” and “product regulation;” 
see ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 68, at 74–75. 
72 See infra note 201. 
73 See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2075, 2075 (2016). (noting that “[c]ompliance is the new corporate governance” and arguing 
that the impact of compliance requirements is changing the way corporations operate making 
traditional corporate theory outdated); see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate 
Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009). (noting the expansion of the compliance industry, 
following major scandals and misconducts, but questioning the effectiveness of new compliance 
regimes).  
74  The international instruments adopted by UNCITRAL and the law reforms facilitated 
by the World Bank Group aim to establish a legal infrastructure to foster an inclusive access to credit 
towards the realization of the overarching goal of eradicating poverty by 2030. See G.A. Res. 70/1, 
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept. 25, 2015); and WBG 
Knowledge Guide supra n 11 at 4. 
75 See supra note 15.  
76 See UNCITRAL Practice Guide supra note 11 at 8-9.  
77 Id. paras 365-372. See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 15. (for the first systematic 
analysis of the coordination failures between secured transactions law and financial regulation and 
for suggestions on for their possible resolution). 
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C. Coordination Failures 
CLIs can be problematic. Almost three decades ago, Gunter Teubner 
presciently hypothesized that “should the law of a global society become entangled 
within sectoral interdependences, a wholly new form of conflicts law will 
emerge”.78 Indeed, when the converging commercial law branches do not realize a 
fluid and synergistic interaction, legal conundrums emerge resoundingly. We posit 
that such coordination failures can be divided into two classes. 
The first class comprises coordination failures stemming from gaps in the 
law.79 In such instances, intersecting branches do not govern expressly or implicitly 
the CLI at hand but leave it instead either partly or entirely shrouded in silence. For 
example, transactions in which a registered trademark is used as collateral engender 
a CLI between secured transactions law and trademarks law.80 Assuming 
hypothetically that a person first grants a security interest in one of their trademarks 
to a creditor, and then subsequently assigns this same trademark to another person, 
it is well-established that Article 9 governs the creation of this security interest, its 
enforceability against third parties (perfection) and priority against other secured 
creditors. It is equally uncontentious that the Lanham Act81 governs trademark 
 
78 Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 7, at 1000 (describing such collisions as 
“intersystemic conflicts law” that are “derived not from collisions between the distinct nations of 
private international law, but from collisions between distinct global social sectors”). 
79 Legal gaps (or lacunae) have been the subject of a vast body of scholarship. This Article 
is only concerned with the issue of gaps in dispositive sources of law, such as legal statutes and 
administrative enactments; see generally BARAK, supra note 16, at 66–72 (analyzing the nature of 
statutory gaps and providing an exhaustive bibliography); Marijan Pavcnik, Why Discuss Gaps in 
the Law Notes, 9 RATIO JURIS 72 (1996) (providing a map the issues created by statutory gaps); 
FERNANDO ATRIA, ON LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 76–87 (2002) (examining a broad range of 
theories to address statutory gaps). This Article is not concerned with the issue of whether there are 
social contexts in which no law applies; see HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 242–46 (1967) 
(identifying this issue and presenting his theory that the law is gapless). Neither is this Article 
concerned with the issue of gaps in contracts, wills and other private law instruments; see Omri Ben-
Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts Freedom from 
Contract Symposium, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389 (2004) (for an exhaustive map of the theoretical issues 
presented by gaps in contracts); Heinz Strohbach, Filling Gaps in Contracts Unification of 
International Trade Law: UNCITRAL’s First Decade, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 479 (1979) 
(comparatively analyzing contract gaps in the context of arbitration).  
80 For an analysis of the legal framework governing the use of trademarks as collateral, see 
Thomas M. Ward, The Perfection and Priority Rules for Security Interests in Copyrights, Patents, 
and Trademarks: The Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed Legislative Cures Symposium: 
Financing the Enterprise of the Internet, 53 ME. L. REV. 391, 440–48 (2001); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, 
Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1, 24–29 (2007); John L. Mesrobian & 
Kenneth R. Schaefer, Secured Transactions Based on Intellectual Property, 72 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 827, 849–56 (1990). 
81 Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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assignments. However, neither Article 9 nor the Lanham Act address conflicts 
between secured creditors and trademarks transferees. It is unclear whether a 
perfected security interest in a registered trademark prevails over either a 
subsequent assignment of this same trademark recorded in the Trademarks Register 
or even a prior unrecorded transfer. It is equally unsettled whether recording a 
security interest in the Trademarks Register has legal effect as actual or constructive 
notice for third parties. These issues are entirely uncertain.82 
The second class encompasses coordination failures arising from 
incongruences.83 This occurs when the combined application of the rules and 
principles of the intersecting commercial law branches result in a regime that is 
either contradictory, dysfunctional or a combination of the two. For example, the 
relevant provisions may establish prescriptions and proscriptions that are either 
partially or entirely conflicting. Alternatively, the respective scope of application 
of the rules and standards in question may be unclear. Still differently, the regime 
hatched by the intersecting commercial law branches may, holistically considered, 
produce outcomes that impede the parties from achieving their intended outcomes 
for the transactions in question. A case in point is offered by the CLI between 
secured transactions law and financial regulation. When a bank with national 
charter84 secures a commercial loan against an item of personal property, the 
ensuing transaction attracts the attention of both Article 9 and Title 12 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations.85 In this scenario, conflict may ensue because secured 
transactions law qualifies this dealing as secured credit, whereas the applicable 
regulatory regime might treat it as unsecured because the encumbered asset does 
not possess the required attributes.86 
CLI coordination failures have diverse negative consequences, the intensity 
of which is scalar rather than binary. In some cases, they reduce legal certainty, as 
 
82 See Ward, supra note 80, at 443–45; Nguyen, supra note 80, at 24–26. 
83 In this Article, we use the term “incongruence” in a sense similar to that used by Colin 
Diver for administrative lawmaking, albeit adapting it to the context of CLIs coordination failures; 
see Diver, supra note 13, at 67.  
84 This is the case of national banks chartered and regulated by the OCC under the National 
Bank Act 12 U.S.C. 1. 
85 Banks and Banking 12 C.F.R. 1–199. 
86 Only certain types of collateral can be effectively used to reduce credit risk and, thus, 
capital requirements. Specifically, the bank must have a first-priority interest on the collateral which 
must be in the form of “(i) Cash on deposit with the national bank or Federal savings association 
[…]; (ii) Gold bullion; (iii) Long-term debt securities that are not resecuritization exposures and that 
are investment grade; (iv) Short-term debt instruments that are not resecuritization exposures and 
that are investment grade; (v) Equity securities that are publicly traded; (vi) Convertible bonds that 
are publicly traded; or (vii) Money market fund shares and other mutual fund shares if a price for 
the shares is publicly quoted daily;” 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.37.  
22 COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS [April 2020 
 
parties are required to contend with a regime the outcomes of which are difficult to 
predict ex ante. In others, they increase complexity by spawning a regime that is 
challenging both to comprehend and operate. In others still, insufficient or flawed 
coordination between intersecting commercial law branches yields an incoherent 
regime that does not align with the parties’ intended outcomes. In all these cases, 
there is a distortion of incentives for the involved parties.  
Crucially, CLI coordination failures increase transaction costs. They render 
more onerous the negotiation process, the drafting of the necessary contracts, the 
gathering of the information required to “discover prices” and the settling of 
disputes. The relative burden of these “transaction costs”87 is proportional to the 
intensity of the coordination failures from which they emanate. When they are 
minimal, the ensuing transaction costs will likely be a manageable burden that 
parties can offset comfortably through the benefits obtained through their voluntary 
exchange. However, when CLI coordination failures are substantial, they carry 
heftier transaction costs that will push parties to consider alternative dealings, 
which would have otherwise been less attractive. In the most severe cases, CLI 
coordination failures will have a chilling effect, generating costs of such magnitude 
as to completely deter parties from entering into such transactions. 
Another illustrative example of these issues is provided by CLIs involving 
financial regulation and secured transactions law. As a general proposition, capital 
adequacy standards compel banks to maintain, at any point in time, a minimum 
level of capital (or regulatory capital) that is composed of a bank’s own funds – 
which include shareholders’ equity and equity-like instruments – and is relative to 
both the total assets of the bank and its actual exposure to risks.88 The resulting 
framework is risk-based, as a higher portion of a bank’s own funds is needed to 
finance riskier loans.89 Therefore, banks are incentivized to reduce their exposure 
 
87 Transactions costs are the costs of participating in the markets and they are distinguished 
from the costs of producing a good or a service. Ronald Coase first introduced the concept of 
transaction costs in his seminal work of 1937; see Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). (positing that firms emerges as mechanisms to reduce the costs affecting 
the production and exchange of good and services). Subsequently, he demonstrated that in situations 
where transactions costs are high, the initial allocation of legal rights has an impact on the efficiency 
of economic activities; see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
Oliver E. Williamson further developed the notion, indicating that each transaction produces three 
types of transactions costs related to monitoring, controlling, and managing transactions; see 
generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
88 See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 54, at 504–11; ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 68, at 
290–301. 
89 This means that regulatory capital connects risk to banks’ equity (or, more generally, 
own funds); see Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71. 
April 2020] COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS  23 
 
 
 
to credit risk in order to maximize their return on equity.90 To this end, banks may 
reduce capital requirements in various fashions, including with the adoption of 
credit risk mitigants, such as security interests. However, as loans secured with 
collateral other than financial collateral are subject to the same level of capital 
requirements attributed to unsecured lending, banks might not be incentivized to 
extend loans secured with any other personal property.91 Such a conundrum affects 
the structure of incentives in the credit market, as legal and regulatory incentives 
affect lending behavior in an uneven fashion.92 Capital regulation only applies to 
banking businesses; while any prospective lender can take advantage of the broad 
applicability of secured transactions law. Given that capital adequacy standards 
induce banks to invest in operations that require less capital than asset-based 
lending to SMEs, the coordination failure unwittingly favors the extension of such 
a form of credit outside the banking system.93 
The use of unregistered copyrights as collateral gives rise to a CLI between 
secured transactions law and copyright law that presents similar issues.94 The 
prevailing judicial view is that the creation of security interests in all types of 
 
90 See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES 110–11 (2013) 
(noting that the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem on corporate finance are not met 
because deposit guarantees schemes as well as favorable tax treatment for debt instruments result in 
a lower cost of debt); see also Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that the regulatory 
risk-weights “are the pivot steering the choices of individual banks, as they determine the costs of 
funding for the extension of credit.”). The tendency of banks to maximize return on equity by 
reducing the cost of capital has also been associated with regulatory arbitrage strategies; see 
generally David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 35 (2000); Erik Gerding, The 
Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 357 
(2016). 
91 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
92 See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 83.  
93 See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 15, at 586 (noting that capital adequacy standards 
play a role in shaping “a market for secured credit in which assets or transactions deemed too risky 
to serve as eligible credit protection are instead employed by non-bank institutions”). This tendency 
might fuel “shadow banking” activities, intended as credit intermediation activities occurring 
partially or completely outside the banking system; Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow 
Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012) (offering an analysis of the origins of shadow 
banking and its regulatory challenges). 
94 See Ward, supra note 80, at 414–29 (assessing the use of copyright as collateral under 
Article 9); Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law 
Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1996) (noting the uncertainties surrounding the use of copyright 
as collateral); Peter L. Choate, Belts, Suspenders, and the Perfection of Security Interests in 
Copyrights: The Undressing of the Contemporary Creditor Notes and Comments, 31 LOY. L. A. L. 
REV. 1415 (1997) (discussing the anomalies of the perfection regime governing security interests in 
copyright). 
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copyright (both registered and unregistered) is governed by Article 9.95 Perfection 
and priority of security interests in registered copyrights is subject to the Copyright 
Act and the Copyright Registry.96 By contrast, perfection and priority of security 
interests in unregistered copyright falls within the remit of Article 9 and its filing 
system.97 This bifurcation brings with a range of difficulties. Most notably, the 
holder of an unregistered copyright can choose – at any moment in time – to record 
it in the Copyright Registry and, thus, transform it into registered copyright; 
however, neither Article 9 nor the Copyright Act address coherently the impact of 
this transition regarding security interests. The resulting regime governing this CLI 
is that if an unregistered copyright is subsequently registered, any security interest 
previously perfected under Article 9 in the asset becomes ineffective against third 
parties. Consequently, any such security interests must be re-perfected pursuant to 
the rules of the Copyright Act and will be defeated by any competing claim that has 
been recorded in the Copyright registry in the intervening time.98 This coordination 
failure renders the use of unregistered copyrights as collateral unappealing for 
potential secured creditors, due to being exposed to the risk of losing third party 
effectiveness. It disincentivizes market participants from entering into secured 
transactions involving these assets, producing a chilling effect that ultimately 
depresses their value. 
 
 
95 In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 at 522-523 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) and 
implicitly confirmed in In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120; see Ward, supra note 80, 
at 414–17 (critically analyzing these decisions). 
96 See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 116 B.R. 194, 
199-203 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
97 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 at 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2002). See 
Stacey G. Jernigan et al., The Perfection of Liens in Unregistered Copyrights: Aerocon and Beyond 
Bankruptcy and the UCC: Points of Intersection and Conflict Symposium, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
645 (2003) (providing an exhaustive analysis of this decision). 
98 See Justin M. Vogel, Perfecting Security Interests in Unregistered Copyrights: 
Preemption of the Federal Copyright Act and How Filing in Accordance with Article 9 Leads to the 
Creation of a Bankruptcy Force Play International Insolvency: Note, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
463 (2002) (who describes perfection of security interests in unregistered copyright as “illusory”); 
Ward, supra note 80, at 428–29 (arguing for legal reform). 
April 2020] COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS  25 
 
 
 
II. UNDERSTANDING COORDINATION FAILURES: THE LEGAL THEORY 
PERSPECTIVE 
Legal scholars, lawmakers and interpreters have long grappled with gaps 
and incongruences in the law.99 Extensive efforts have been devoted to defining 
when silence in a legal text can be said to constitute a gap, the extent to which 
judges and regulators are permitted to fill such gaps, and the criteria that should be 
used in this interpretive task.100 Incongruences in the law have been the subject of 
even greater scrutiny.101 A range of canons of construction have been formulated, 
both to overcome contradictions that emerge within a single law,102 and to resolve 
conflicts between rules and standards stemming from distinct legal sources.103 
Similarly, courts and commentators have debated vivaciously the extent to which 
interpreters may correct, add or subtract from rules and standards the application of 
which would otherwise result in dysfunctional or even absurd outcomes.104 
This part considers first the extent to which hermeneutical instruments 
designed to address gaps and incongruences are helpful to address CLI coordination 
failures. Having outlined the inadequacy of these approaches, we turn to the notion 
of legal coherence for recourse, and posit that it should be placed at the heart of any 
interpretive method that seeks to overcome the challenges presented by the 
convergence of commercial law branches.  
  
A. Venturing Beyond Legal Consistency 
Whenever gaps or incongruences in the law surface, interpreters are 
confronted with choices. To guide and assist this decision-making process, scholars 
 
99 See generally JONES, supra note 16; SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 16, at 36, 37, 40; BENNION, supra note 16, at 42–49; BARAK, supra 
note 16, at 66–73; CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 269; CROSS, supra note 16, at 65–80.  
100 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 66–73; CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 269. 
101 For lawmaking perspective, see generally Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 13; 
Diver, supra note 13. For an interpretive perspective see generally SUTHERLAND STATUTES & 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 16, ch. 37; BARAK, supra note 16, at 74–80; CRAWFORD, 
supra note 16, at 263–68. 
102 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 74–75 (offering a comparative overview of the 
hermeneutical approaches followed in different jurisdictions); CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 263–
64 (examining a range of canons of interpretation adopted by US courts). 
103 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 75–77; CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 264–66. 
104 See JONES, supra note 16, sec. 286 (discussing the limits of the “consequentialist 
constructions” and suggesting that their origin can be traced back to the consequential construction); 
BARAK, supra note 16, at 79–80; CROSS, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing the “golden rule”); 
BENNION, supra note 16, at 41–49 (exploring consequentialist and rectifying constructions). 
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and lawmakers have elaborated hermeneutical methods which rely on an array of 
norms and conventions. Grounded in diverse theories, these interpretation tools 
offer elastic standards and presumptions through which substantive meaning is 
extrapolated from the text, structure, context, subject matter and purpose of the law 
under consideration.105  
Though not without differences, the common denominator of canons of 
interpretation intended to address gaps and incongruences in the law is 
“consistency”.106 Some focus on internal consistency, addressing endogenous 
contradictions and ambiguities within the law under consideration.107 Others 
concentrate instead on external consistency, tackling gaps and incongruences 
between distinct systems of rules.108 The notion of consistency in law resonates 
with that formulated in philosophy of mathematics. Internal consistency demands 
that a system of rules and logical deductions is devoid of self-contradictions. 
External consistency requires that the rules and logical deductions of one system 
are mutually compatible with those of another.109 
In addressing CLI coordination failures, the limitations of canons of 
interpretation that focus exclusively on internal consistency are readily apparent. 
Branches of commercial law, while increasing in sophistication and expanding their 
outreach, have been developed to ensure internal consistency through rules and 
logical deductions that are, by design, mutually compatible. Hence, canons of 
interpretation aimed at promoting internal consistency are structurally unsuited to 
the resolution of coordination failures in CLIs, where compatibility issues emerge 
across multiple branches, rather than within a single one.  
At first glance, canons of interpretation aimed at ensuring external 
consistency between distinct laws might appear more suitable interpretative tools 
in the context of CLIs. Among them, the lex specialis and lex superior doctrines 
deserve special consideration. The former establishes that when two laws cover the 
same subject matter, the one specifically devoted to the issue under consideration 
 
105 The literature exploring theories of legal interpretation is vase. See generally POPKIN, 
supra note 4, ch. 2–3 (for an exhaustive analysis of theories of interpretation); NEIL D. 
MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2016) 
(for a recent comparative study of this topic).  
106 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 61–80; SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 16, ch. 36, 37, 40. 
107 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 74–75; CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 263–64. 
108 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 75–77; CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 264–66. 
109 See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 
94–95 (Anniversary edition ed. 1999); Hillel Bavli, Applying the Laws of Logic to the Logic of Laws, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 937, 937–39 (2006). 
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(lex specialis) should be favored over that with a general remit (lex generalis).110 
The latter resolves clashes between laws by giving primacy to the one holding the 
highest rank within the relevant legal system.111  
Neither one of these doctrines offers alone a satisfactory resolution of CLIs’ 
coordination failures.  
With regard to lex specialis, the identification of a special-general 
relationship is problematic. In CLIs, the intersecting commercial law branches are 
generally not in a relationship of subordination, rather they overlap and engender 
a new system of rules and principles that governs a determinate transaction or 
corporate action.112 Coordination failures stem from gaps and incongruences 
between determinate rules, rather than the intersecting branches in their entirety. 
Therefore, the special-general relationship is situational and cannot be determined 
a priori. For example, financial regulation articulates sets of rules that govern 
determinate financial activities, which are concurrently subject to contract and 
corporate law. For certain key aspects, such as shareholders’ voting rights, 
corporate law is the lex specialis; whereas, financial regulation is deemed lex 
generalis. By contrast, matters concerning the composition and responsibilities of 
the board of directors, this special-general relationship is inverted. 
Regarding lex superior, this canon of interpretation is also an imperfect tool 
to address CLI coordination failures. In the first place, commercial law branches 
generally exist at the same constitutional level. Accordingly, in a CLI, it is not 
possible to give precedence to the rules of one of the intersecting branches based 
on them having a higher authority. Moreover, even when a legal system does 
establish that one commercial law branch is constitutionally superior to another, 
addressing a CLI on this basis is ineffective if not outright detrimental. For 
example, faithful to the Constitutional “supremacy clause”,113 Article 9 provides 
 
110 The lex specialis canon of construction has deep roots; see HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE 
BELLI AC PACIS. LIBRI TRES, Bk. 2, Ch. XXIX (noting that special rules should be favored over 
general rules when they are either more closely related to the given subject matter or provide a more 
effective legal framework). See generally BARAK, supra note 16, at 75; Anja Lindroos, Addressing 
Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L 
L. 27 (2005); Koskenniemi Report supra n 1 paras 56-122 (for a comprehensive analysis of the lex 
specialis canon of interpretation in international law) 
111 See generally SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 16, 
ch. 36; BARAK, supra note 16, at 76. 
112 A set of rules bound together by interpretative criteria define a self-contained system; 
see supra subpart I.A.   
113 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The body of scholarship on the supremacy clause is immense. 
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 731–
34 (2010) (for an exhaustive bibliography). 
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that its provisions are preempted by any conflicting federal law.114 Applying this 
rule, US courts have held that the federal Copyright Act regime for “mortgages” 
and “hypothecations” of registered copyrights preempts that laid out by Article 9 
for all intangibles.115 Thus, this CLI between Article 9 and the Copyright Act is 
resolved pursuant to the lex superior canon of interpretation. Regrettably, such an 
application of federal law yields an inefficient regime that suits the needs of neither 
secured creditors nor debtors. Under the filing system of the Copyright Act, secured 
creditors are required to effectuate discrete filings for each encumbered asset, 
depositing the relevant transfer documents and identifying each copyright by its 
registration number.116 Recognizing the undesirable outcome produced by the lex 
superior interpretative canon in this CLI, Judge Kozinski remarked that “filing with 
the Copyright Office can be much less convenient than filing under the U.C.C.”117 
The preceding discourse shows that a fetishistic pursuit of legal consistency 
exacerbates CLIs’ coordination problems. When internal consistency is taken as the 
sole interpretative criterion self-referentiality of each intersecting branch will result 
hardened. As gaps and incongruences will be addressed to perpetuate inner logics, 
the autonomous character of each branch will result bolstered. Applying such an 
inward-looking method of interpretation will intensify coordination failures, rather 
than favoring the harmonious coalescence between intersecting branches.118 In a 
similar vein, when external consistency is taken as the sole interpretative criterion, 
one of the intersecting commercial law branches will be bluntly given primacy over 
 
114 U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1) provides that “this article does not apply to the extent that … a 
statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article”. See HARRIS & MOONEY, 
supra note 8, at 359–64 (exhaustively analyzing this section and the emerging preemption 
doctrines). 
115 National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. at 199-203, 205. 
See Ward, supra note 80, at 420–24. 
116 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)-(d). These sections govern the effectiveness against third parties 
of copyright transfers. Under subsection 205(d), only a recording “in the manner required to give 
constructive notice under subsection (c)” is good against a “later transfer”. 
117 National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass’n, 116 B.R. at 202 n.10. 
118 Internal consistency is a feature that pertains to self-contained and self-referential 
systems of rules. Given that self-contained systems reflect sector-specific logics, internal 
consistency would further reaffirm such inner logics; see Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 
7, at 1013 (indicating that self-contained regimes are “structurally coupled with the independent 
logic of the social sectors [of appurtenance]”). In turn, internal consistency pertains to self-
referentiality because it supports the circular relationship between norms and decisions; see 
Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society, supra note 7, at 295 (noting that a particular type of self-
referentiality, termed “autopoiesis”, emerges when decisions to resolve a conflict refer to criteria 
that are within such system). See also Koskenniemi Report supra n 1 para 625 (noting that the 
pursuit of the consistent interpretation of one specific treaty might be at the expense of “the 
consistency of the multilateral treaty system as a whole.”). 
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the others without due regard for the CLI in its entirety. It is highly doubtful that 
such a mechanical interpretive approach will deliver a regime that enables the 
parties to carry out effectively the transaction in question according to their 
idiosyncratic preferences. These shortcomings suggest that a different, more 
systematic method is necessary to orient the concomitant interpretation of 
commercial law branches and resolve coordination failures. To this end, the notion 
of legal coherence is of critical support. 
  
B. Legal Coherence 
The notion of legal coherence has been theorized as a means to redress 
ambiguities and conflicts in the law.119 Advocated by some as an interpretive 
panacea and opposed by others as an undue interference on textual interpretations, 
its definition, conceptual perimeter and applicability have sparked sophisticated 
jurisprudential discourse.120 Drawing from such debates and with the aid of legal 
theory and philosophy of mathematics, it becomes apparent that coherence is a 
composite notion with the following three fundamental traits.  
First, in logic, coherence between a plurality of deductive systems requires 
that they are both mutually compatible and internally devoid of contradictions.121 
Correspondingly, in law, coherence between a multiplicity of systems of rules and 
principles requires the simultaneous attainment of internal and external 
consistency.122 However, internal and external consistency alone are not sufficient.  
 
119 The body of scholarship exploring the notion of coherence is vast. See generally Hage, 
supra note 17; Bertea, supra note 17; Rodriguez-Blanco, supra note 17; Schiavello, supra note 17; 
Peczenik, supra note 17; Raz, supra note 17; Hurley, supra note 17; MacCormick, supra note 17; 
AARNIO, supra note 17. 
120 Bertea, supra note 17, at 371–72 (summarizing this debate and noting that “[w]hile there 
is wide agreement among contemporary legal theorists on the characterization of coherence in the 
negative as lack of inconsistencies, it is still a question how coherence might be defined in positive 
terms.”). 
121 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 109, at 94–100. (indicating that external consistency 
relates to deductions that are external to the system under consideration and internal consistency 
relates to the mutual compatibility of logical deductions within a system). The attainment of internal 
and external consistency is aspirational rather than a normative prescription; inconsistency and 
incompleteness are inherent to logical systems. On the incompleteness theorem first formulates by 
Kurt Gödel see infra note 127. 
122 The relation between “total consistency” and “coherence” is central to Ronald 
Dworkin’s argument and critique of legal positivism; see DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 119–27. 
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Second, for a system to be coherent its rules and logical deductions must 
have a “unity of purpose.”123 That is to say that it must “hang together … making 
sense as whole”.124  Coherence demands that a system of rules and principles is 
woven together on the basis of an ordering criterion. From a normative standpoint, 
this entails that the coherence is only possible when a legal system possesses 
overarching, guiding purposes towards the realization of which its rules and 
principles gravitate. Such overarching, guiding purposes may be drawn from a 
broad social, moral, economic or political spectrum,125 depending on the subject 
matter in question and the relevant jurisdiction. 
Third, absolute coherence is unattainable.126 Both consistency and unity of 
purpose can never be achieved perfectly. Regarding consistency, in logic and legal 
reasoning alike, it has been long established that a system can never be truly free of 
internal ambiguities and conflicts nor can it be complete.127 Similarly, in respect of 
unity of purpose, it is impossible for the totality of the rules and principles of a 
system to all be uniformly and consonantly aligned with its overarching guiding 
purposes.128 Accordingly, coherence is scalar rather than binary in nature; between 
the most coherent and the most incoherent solutions there lies a field of intermediate 
options. 
The above lends robust support to the view that a legal method to address 
CLI coordination failures should seek legal coherence. However, attention should 
not be cast towards each intersecting branch discretely. Crucially, the focus should 
be on the intersection itself, understood as a system of logical deductions and legal 
 
123 See MacCormick, supra note 17, at 236 (who speaks of “unity of principle”); Raz, supra 
note 17, at 284 (who speaks of a unified set of principles). 
124 MacCormick, supra note 17, at 235. 
125 See Id. at 238; AARNIO, supra note 17, at 177–80; Schiavello, supra note 17, at 233–37.  
126 See Alexy & Peczenik, supra note 17 (who speak of a degree of approximation to 
coherence); Raz, supra note 17, at 287 (who notes that absolute coherence is impossible due to the 
pluralistic principles underlying all legal systems); MacCormick, supra note 17, at 248–51. 
127 In philosophy of mathematics, according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, every 
system of logical deductions is necessarily incomplete; attempts to compensate such a condition 
would require the implementation of complex reasoning compromising the consistency among the 
chain of deductions; see generally KURT GÖDEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF 
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (Bernard Meltzer trans., 1962). The applicability 
of Gödel incompleteness theorem to law have sparked an intriguing debate; for an overview see 
Mark Brown & Andrew Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal 
Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 1439 (1992). 
(arguing that Gödel’s theorem indicates that law is necessarily incomplete, thus advancing a critique 
to legal formalism); see also Bavli, supra note 109, at 938. (indicating that the law itself contains 
“limitations on its capacity to realize formal consistency). 
128 See MacCormick, supra note 17, at 245–51; Raz, supra note 17, at 286–87. 
April 2020] COMMERCIAL LAW INTERSECTIONS  31 
 
 
 
rules.129 Hence, CLI coordination failures should be addressed with the aim of 
ensuring that internal and external consistency are simultaneously attained through 
a unity of purpose. Given that a CLI arises from the overlap of different branches 
that jointly realize a legal regime for determinate transactions, its purpose is not 
explicit but must be inferred. This investigation warrants careful consideration. 
 
C. Finding Purpose  
Purpose is an overworked notion in legal theory. Scholars have devoted 
copious  time and effort to defining this concept, appraising its significance and 
theorizing the approaches by which it should be extrapolated.130 At their core, 
purposive methods seek to link a system of rules and logical deductions to its “true 
reason”;131 nevertheless, different schools of thought construe this nexus on the 
basis of profoundly diverse constituent elements and methodologies.132 
For the present enquiry, the purpose of a CLI should be understood as a 
normative concept which comprises the underlying social and economic policies 
and political objectives that this system is designed to attain. Regarding the 
elements that should be appraised to infer such purpose, two key issues require 
consideration. The first is the relevance that should be attributed to the textual 
elements of the CLI in question.  
On this matter, jurisprudence theories addressing “hard cases” – within 
which CLIs would typically fall – provide a useful frame of reference.133 Ronald 
 
129 See supra Part I.B. 
130 The purposive method has deep roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence. SIR JOHN 
BAKER, THE REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA 1216–1616, 222 (2017) (who notes that, by late 
sixteenth century, it had long been established that readers in the inns of court had “to begin their 
exposition of a statute by offering a historical explanation of the mischief at which it was aimed”). 
BARAK, supra note 16, at 89; Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 
262–65 (1981); L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd ed. 1969); G. Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice 
105 (1968).  
131 This proposition can be traced back to the Heydon’s Case 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 
1584) (in which the English Court of Exchequer interpreted an Henrician statute concerning the 
dissolution of monasteries, based on its construction of the “true reason” of this law). 
132 POPKIN, supra note 4, ch. 2–3 (for a comprehensive historical analysis and an exhaustive 
bibliography). 
133 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1974–1975); H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (3d ed. 2012) (for the positivist approach to hard cases); JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 197 (1979); Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957) (criticizing 
H.L.A. Hart’s dichotomy between standard cases that do not require a contextual approach and 
penumbral cases that warrant a broader contextual approach); Max Radin, Realism in Statutory 
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Dworkin axiomatically posits that textual indications are insufficient and that 
recourse to elements outside the semantic datum is necessary.134 Similarly, Lon 
Fuller argues that textual elements are inherently indeterminate, if considered in 
isolation and suggests that an assessment of the context in which legal rules are 
intended to operate is always required.135 In like manner, Aharon Barak argues that 
the semantic components of a rule only reveal the range of its possible meanings 
and suggests that the analysis of extra textual elements is necessary.136 Arguably, 
recourse to contextual elements also finds support in H.L.A. Hart’s positivist 
approach, whenever a case under consideration falls within the “cone of penumbra” 
of the applicable rules and cannot be resolved on the basis of the plain meaning of 
the text.137 
As CLI coordination failures are caused by gaps and incongruences between 
intersecting commercial law branches, it stands to reason that textual elements will 
generally be scarce supplying only limited indications. The search for the guiding 
purposes instrumental to fostering legal coherence will almost invariably have to 
go beyond textual elements and venture into the relevant context. 
Having established that a contextual approach is required to infer the 
purpose of a CLI, the second issue concerns the content and boundaries of this 
assessment. Looking again at jurisprudence theories as a frame of reference, a rich 
plurality of views emerges. Ronald Dworkin broadly suggests that the relevant 
context from which purposes should be inferred is the “political structure” of the 
relevant community and in particular its principles of political morality.138 Taking 
a different approach, Aharon Barak suggests that the context from which the 
purpose of a system of rules should be extrapolated is the combined product of the 
subjective intent of the legislature and the objective intent of the legal system in 
which it operates considered as a whole.139 
 
Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 156 (1934–1935) (expressing the realist approach 
to hard cases).  
134 See Dworkin, supra note 133, at 1059–61. 
135 See Fuller, supra note 133, at 661–70. 
136 See BARAK, supra note 16, at 6–7, 120–22, 148–52.  
137 See HART, supra note 133, at 123–26. 
138 See Ronald Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited Dunwoody Distinguished Lecture in Law, 
34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165–67 (1981–1982). 
139 See BARAK, supra note 16, at IX, 110, 148 (Barak theorizes that the context from which 
purpose should be inferred is expression of the internal relationship between the intent of the specific 
author (‘subjective’) and the intent of a reasonable author (‘objective’); at the highest level of 
abstraction objective intent is “the intent of the system” it is “a legal construction that reflects the 
needs of society. It is an expression of a social ideal”). 
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Regarding CLIs, we submit that the contextual enquiry instrumental to the 
extrapolation of purpose should focus on the relevant intersecting branches. As 
each CLI is a new system of rules and logical deductions that stems from two or 
more commercial law branches,140 it follows that these intersecting branches offer 
the primary contextual datum. Hence, to identify the socio-economic goals of the 
CLI under consideration it will be necessary to elicit the purposes of each 
intersecting branch. In this respect, it should be noted that some commercial law 
branches are characterized by statutes that declare their underlying purposes 
explicitly. For example, embodying Karl Llewellyn’s “principle of patent 
reason”,141 the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) states that its policies and 
underlying purposes are “(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make 
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”142 
In similar vein, a growing number of regulatory regimes expressly state 
their purposes. Typically, this occurs when administrative authorities exercise their 
delegated powers to regulate a specific sector of the economy through “new 
governance” approaches.143 New governance entails experimental regulatory 
 
140 See supra I.B. 
141 See WILLIAM L. TWINING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS (1968) (citing a Karl 
Llewellyn 1944 stating “The principle of the patent reason: Every provision should show its reason 
on its face. Every body of provisions should display on their face their organizing principle.”). 
142 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2019). On the interpretation of the UCC, see generally Peter A. 
Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on Purpose in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 
419 (1997); Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code:  Some 
Implications for Jurisprudence, U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1978); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Commercial Code: Part II, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951). 
143 See, generally, Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: New Governance Techniques and 
the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037 (2012) (advancing a critical analysis on the 
effectiveness of new governance techniques following the global financial crisis); Saule T. 
Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 411, (noting the need to redefine the interactions between public and private actors 
through regulatory approaches that stimulate the implementation of self-regulatory measures) 
(2011); Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation:  A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 285 (2011) (noting the relationship between novel principle-
based approaches and “new governance”); Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial 
Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital 
Adequacy Regulation, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 783, 838 (2010) (ctrically examining the 
application of new governance approaches in the context of banking regulation); and Cristie Ford, 
New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation, WIS. L. REV. 
441, 105 (2010) (indicating that new governance approaches are “underpinned by a bottom-up, 
decentered, horizontal experimental process” involving private actors). For an application of new 
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structures that are polycentric, as they transcend the public-private divide by 
entrusting regulated entities with key regulatory functions. In this schema, the 
purpose of a regulatory provision is enunciated in general principles that indicate 
the behavior which regulated entities must adopt. Thus, the purpose is an integral 
component of principle-based regulation, whereby regulatory outcomes are 
enunciated, while discretion as to the most suitable methods to achieve them is left 
to financial institutions.144 Differently, “rule-based” approaches145 are concerned 
with detailing the process that regulated entities must follow to attain the desired 
outcomes.146  
 
III. A NOVEL METHOD 
The preceding discourse has suggested that the attainment of coherence 
within CLIs is instrumental to addressing their coordination failures. This requires 
that the relevant rules and principles are consistent both with each other and their 
appertaining branches, and that such consistency is attained through a set of guiding 
purposes inferred from both textual and contextual elements. This part articulates a 
two-step method that incorporates these critical elements and offers the requisite 
flexibility. 
For both clarity and simplicity, our analysis below primarily relies on 
examples of CLIs that involve two commercial law branches; the additional 
 
governance approaches in the context of FinTech see Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 582 (2019). (arguing that some of the new approaches to regulate FinTech 
are an application of new governance approaches and principle-based regulation given). 
144 Principle-based regulation is also referred to as “outcome-based”, or “performance-
based”, and is distinguished from process-orientated regulation; on this distinction see infra note 
146. 
145 In finance, principle-based regulation has been heralded as an outcome orientated 
approach designed to foster ethical standards in a flexible manner; whereas rule-based regulation 
has been typically associated with a narrow mindset of formal compliance. Such a sharp dichotomy 
has been criticized on different grounds; for an analysis of the main limits associated to this 
understanding see Black, supra note 143, at 1043. (noting that regulatory regimes necessitate both 
principles and rules). Further on the connection between principle-based and rule-based regulation, 
see Cunningham, supra note 5. (illustrating how corporate law, securities regulation, and accounting 
are necessarily characterized by both general principles and detailed rules). 
146 Rule-based regulation is also referred to as “process-orientated” as the focus is on 
procedural requirements; whereas outcome-orientated regulation is concerned with benchmarking 
performance with regulatory objectives; see Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in 
the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 257, 275 (2010); Cary 
Coglianese, Performance-Based Regulation: Concepts and Challenges, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATION 410 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016) (indicating that principle-based 
regulation might not be always outcome-based regulation as the former has a larger scope). 
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complexities generated by the presence of multiple intersecting branches will be 
highlighted where appropriate. 
 
A. The First Step: Deconstructing the context  
The preliminary operation required to address a CLI affected by 
coordination failures is to identify which commercial law branches are involved. 
The base case will typically involve two branches. For example, a transaction in 
which a newly-formed corporate entity sells blockchain tokens that are intended to 
confer contractually determinate voting and participation rights to their buyers, 
produces a CLI between corporate law and financial regulation, including securities 
and capital markets law.147 In like manner, a transaction in which parties agree to 
create a security interest in a pool of copyright licenses, there will be an intersection 
between secured transactions law and copyright law.148 More demanding cases will 
present CLIs that feature multiple intersecting branches. For example, a transaction 
in which a special purpose vehicle acquires a pool of residential mortgages and 
concurrently sells securities (i.e. mortgage backed securities) to investors under 
which it contractually promises to distribute the ensuing mortgage payments, forges 
a CLI between corporate law, secured transactions law and financial regulation.149 
Similarly, in a transaction in which a bank extends a loan secured by all the 
borrower’s present and future patents, will yield a CLI between secured 
transactions law, patent law, and financial regulation.150  
Once the intersecting commercial law branches have been identified, 
attention can shift to deconstructing the problematic CLI in question by bringing 
into focus both its textual and contextual elements. Regarding the former, it is 
 
147 See Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019) 
(for an exhaustive analysis of the technical and legal aspects of “initial coin offerings”); Dirk A. 
Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for 
Regulators, 60 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267 (2019) (expounding the regulatory challenges created by initial 
coin offerings). 
148 See generally Andrea Tosato, Secured Transactions and IP Licenses: Comparative 
Observations and Reform Suggestions Secured Transactions Law in the Twenty-First Century, 81 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (2018) (for a comparative analysis of the use of IP licenses as 
collateral). 
149 See Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization: And For What Purpose, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1283 (2011–2012). (providing a general theory on securitization and an exhaustive 
bibliography); Tracy Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Unenforceable Securitization Contracts, 37 YALE J. 
ON REG. (2020) (who uncover a range of incongruences besetting the overlap that governs 
securitization contracts involving mortgage backed securities). 
150 See Ward, supra note 80, at 429–40 (analyzing of the intersection between patent law 
and Article 9). 
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necessary to determine precisely which rules and principles give rise to the 
coordination failures under consideration. The aim of this investigation is to chart 
the perimeter of the CLI and isolate its constitutive elements. The resultant data are 
instrumental both to classifying the coordination failures and appraising their 
intensity. For example, in relation to the CLI governing the use of copyright as 
collateral, this investigation would delve into both secured transactions and 
copyright sources of law to isolate the provisions that have caused coordination 
failures.151 Similarly, for the CLI that is formed when a regulated financial 
institution takes security in assets other than financial collateral,152 attention would 
have to be directed at the applicable financial regulation and secured transactions 
laws to dissect the rules and principles that spawn the current incongruous regime. 
Regarding the contextual elements, the relationship between the CLI in 
question and its constituent commercial law branches needs to be appreciated 
systematically. The aim of this assessment is to appraise the importance of the rules 
and principles that engender the coordination failure under consideration, relative 
to their appertaining commercial law branch. For this analysis, we suggest that each 
commercial law branch should be viewed as a tripartite spherical structure formed 
of a core, a middle sphere and an outer sphere to the sphere in question. Each rule 
and principle involved in the CLI under consideration should be classified within 
one of these concentric spheres depending on its systemic relevance.153 In like 
manner to the bands in the “coloured spectrum” that appears when passing white 
light through a prism,154 the three layers of this systemization fade into each other, 
rather than being separated by stark demarcation lines. Accordingly, there will be 
borderline cases in which it might be challenging to establish exactly where a 
determinate rule falls within the sphere. Nevertheless, this tripartition is a valuable 
analytical tool, as it provides a useful framework by which the causative elements 
of a CLI coordination failure can be contextualized within their commercial law 
branch. Below we explore in detail the core, the middle sphere and the outer sphere. 
 
151 See Id. at 414–29 (analyzing of the intersection between the Copyright Act and Article 
9); Haemmerli, supra note 94 (emphasizing coordination failures between the Copyright Act and 
Article 9); Andrea Tosato, Security Interests over Intellectual Property, 6 JOURNAL OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & PRACTICE 93 (2010) (analyzing this intersection under english 
law). 
152 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
153 See infra III.A.1-3. 
154 Between 1666 and 1672, Isaac Newton conducted experiments to study reflections, 
refractions, inflexions and colors of light. He observed that that white light (sunlight) passed through 
a prism separated into its component colors (dispersion) and formed a “coloured spectrum”. See 
ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICKS, OR A TREATISE OF THE REFLEXIONS, REFRACTIONS, INFLEXIONS AND 
COLOURS OF LIGHT, bk. I part I, Prop. II. Theor. II, Exp. 3 (1704).  
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1. The Core: Policy Aims 
In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the core is the 
nucleus encircled by the middle and outer sphere. It comprises the purposes pursued 
by a commercial law branch, intended as its underlying social and economic 
policies and political objectives. These “policy aims”155 serve as the foundations of 
their system of appurtenance. They formulate the ordering criteria and shape the 
development of each commercial law branch. These policy aims may be 
extrapolated from a range of diverse sources. In some cases, they are enshrined in 
statutes,156 in others, they are embedded in regulatory principles,157 in others still 
they emerge from the case law.  Notably, policy aims are not immutable and can 
evolve over time; any such changes will be reflected in the aforementioned textual 
and contextual elements.  
In secured transactions law, this core has been studied extensively. 
Pioneered by Article 9 and increasingly embraced both domestically and 
internationally,158 the “first principle” of secured transactions law is that it should 
enable debtors “to secure as much or as little of their debts with as much or as little 
of their existing and future property as they deem appropriate.”159 This axiom 
embodies a bundle of policy aims which are closely linked and mutually 
reinforcing. From a private law perspective, it is widely accepted that secured 
transactions law should recognize and honor a person’s liberty to use their personal 
property as collateral, consistently with the normative values of freedom of contract 
and free alienation of property.160  As security interests are a type of property right, 
 
155 Throughout Part III the locution “policy aims” is used to indicate the underlying social 
and economic policies and political objectives. Policy aims, in fact, are key to infer the purpose of 
a commercial law branch, see supra II.C.  
156 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 144-145. 
158 See Castellano & Tosato, supra note 34; Anna Veneziano, Italian Secured Transactions 
Law - The Need for Reform, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM 355 (Louise Gullifer & Orkun 
Akseli eds., 2016); Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell & Feliu Rey, supra note 34; Fernando D. 
Hernandez, Secured Credits in Insolvency Proceedings in Argentina, 9 INSOLVENCY & 
RESTRUCTURING INT’L 21 (2015); Marek Dubovec & Cyprian Kambili, Using the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide as a Tool for a Secured Transactions Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case 
of Malawi, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 163 (2013–2014); Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law 
Governing Secured Credit:  The Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173 (1998). 
159 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney Jr, A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 2021, 2021–22 (1994). See 
generally GILMORE, supra note 32. 
160 Harris & Mooney Jr, supra note 159, at 2047–53, 2051–52 (the authors – who served 
as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 – declare 
that they “embrace the baseline principles that underlie current law insofar as it generally respects 
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debtors who grant security interests to their creditors are voluntarily disposing of 
their property; the law should uphold and respect such choices, both between the 
parties and erga omnes, albeit subject to appropriate limitations.161  
From an economic perspective, the prevailing view is that secured 
transactions law should aim to incentivize the extension of credit.162 Security 
interests are risk mitigation devices instrumental to unlocking financing that would 
be unavailable on an unsecured basis.163 They afford lenders an alternative avenue 
to satisfy their obligation, in the event of their debtor’s default. Even when not 
Pareto efficient – typically due to non-consensual transfers of wealth from 
unsecured to secured creditors – the additional capital flows generated by secured 
loans deliver welfare gains that in aggregate outweigh the social costs of these 
dealings.164 From a social perspective, there is growing recognition that secured 
transactions law should aim to bolster financial inclusion. To this end, the legal 
framework governing secured lending should be designed to empower SMEs and 
 
the free and effective alienation of property rights and the ability of parties to enter into enforceable 
contracts. We believe that these principles reflect widely shared normative views that favor party 
autonomy concerning both property and contract.”). 
161 See Id. at 2047–67 (for a forceful argument in support of this thesis). 
162 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, paras §§1.1-1.2 (9th ed. 2014). 
163 See Giuliano G. Castellano, Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A 
New Strategy?, 78 MODERN LAW REVIEW 611, 617 (2015). (noting that one of the primary economic 
functions of security interests in personal property is to allow lenders to manage and mitigate credit 
risk).  
164 Law and economics literature exploring secured transactions law is vast. See generally 
Brian M. McCall, It’s Just Secured Credit - The Natural Law Case in Defense of Some Forms of 
Secured Credit, 43 IND. L. REV. 7, 9–12 (2009) (for an exhaustive bibliography); F.H. Buckley, The 
Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1469 (1986) (submitting that secured credit 
lowers screening costs and that debtors are best placed to determine when giving security maximizes 
value); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
645, 678-79 (1992) (positing that secured credit avoids duplicative monitoring of creditor 
misbehavior); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 
2213 (1994) (asserting that security interests disable the borrower from personal misbehavior). 
Notably, the view that secured credit is efficient is not unanimously accepted; see generally Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: 
Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1315-18 (1997); Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1997); John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'L 
REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1995); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 
1887, 1913-14 (1994); Paul M. Shupack, Defining Purchase Money Collateral, 29 Idaho L. Rev. 
767 (1993). 
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underserved constituencies, whose ingenuity and entrepreneurship have 
traditionally been stifled by the unavailability of affordable capital.165 
In financial regulation, the overarching purpose is to ensure that the 
financial system performs its primary function of allocating and deploying 
economic resources across industries, market participants, and over time.166 
Crucially, markets are not perfect. Their competitive dynamics do not always yield 
the desired and efficient allocation of economic resources. These malfunctions are 
commonly referred to as “market failures” and represent one of the primary 
justifications for public (regulatory) interventions in the financial system.167 
According to this understanding, financial regulation pursues public interests 
(public interest theories),168 rather than being solely molded by the interests of 
 
165 See generally, FREDERIQUE DAHAN & JOHN SIMPSON (EDS.), SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
REFORM AND ACCESS TO CREDIT (2009) (exploring the nexus between secured transactions law and 
access to credit); WBG Knowledge Guide supra n 11 at 4 (emphasizing the importance of inclusive 
access to credit as a core policy aim of secured transactions law); Walsh, supra note 15, at 181–82; 
Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 27, 29–32 (1951); Louise Gullifer & Ignacio Tirado, A Global Tug of 
War: A Topography of Micro-Business Financing Secured Transactions Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113–16 (2018); Steven L. Schwarcz, Empowering the 
Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into Collateralized Credit, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2019). 
166 See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the 
Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3 (Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995) 
(indicating that the overarching socio-economic function of allocating economic resources across 
border and time is realized through a sub-set of functions, including the clearing and settling of 
payments, the management of risks, and the deployment of capital).   
167 Although other reasons, such as social solidarity, lend strong support to the 
implementation of regulatory policies, the market failures rationale – deploying the analytical tools 
of economics – is commonly considered as the main reasons justifying the regulation of financial 
markets; see ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 68, at 51 (noting that the key features of financial markets 
make them prone to market failures); and Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The 
Power and Limits of Law, WIS. L. REV. 815, 818 (2012) (arguing that four types of market failures 
are inherent in the financial system and identifying them as “information failure, rationality failure, 
principal-agent failure, and incentive failure.”). 
168 Public interest theories have developed around the notion that regulators are benevolent 
agents and that the purpose of regulation is to attain publicly desired outcomes; see generally CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1993) 
(advocating for regulation to embrace further this understanding and promote public interests). 
Adopting a public interest approach to identify the purposes of financial regulation does not imply 
that regulation could be influenced by other factors, such as lobbying from interests groups or 
behavioral dynamics; see Giuliano G. Castellano & Geneviève Helleringer, The Social Psychology 
of Financial Regulatory Governance, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 160 
(Emilios Avgouleas & David C. Donald eds., 2019) (advancing a theory to explain how group 
dynamics can impact the collective decision-making process of regulatory agencies). 
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individuals, groups, and industries (interest group theories).169 Through this lens, 
this commercial law branch provides a set of rules and principles that instill 
confidence in the financial system by addressing market failures. In turn, this 
incentivizes markets participants to deploy their capital, supplying both short-term 
liquidity and long-term financing to the “real economy”.170 To this end, regulation 
is designed to achieve two broad policy aims. First, regulatory regimes protect the 
integrity of financial markets, ensuring that they operate in a fair and efficient 
manner.171 This policy aim entails the safeguarding of professional and retail 
investors as well as savers,172 and ramifies into the variety of regimes pertaining to 
 
169 Interest group theories develop around the notion that individuals, such as market 
participants, regulators, or politicians, maximize their own interests. Hence, parties involved in the 
regulatory process seek to maximize their own utility; see generally Sam Peltzman, Toward A More 
General Theory of Regulation, 19 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 211 (1976). (identifying 
the key assumptions to explain the regulatory process); George J. Stigler, Theory of Economic 
Regulation, THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 3 (1971). (advancing 
the idea that regulation is “captured” by regulated entities as the they contribute to its design and 
interpretation for their own benefit). 
170 The term “real economy” refers to that segment of the economic system concerned with 
the production of goods and supply of services; see “Real Economy” in the Cambridge English 
Dictionary & Thesaurus, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/real-economy. 
171 Market integrity, like financial stability, is an elusive concept that has witnessed a 
significant expansion in recent years. In general, behaviors that give rise to market integrity concerns 
encompass a variety of actions that may compromise the efficient functioning of financial markets, 
undermining the confidence of investors; see Janet Austin, What Exactly is Market Integrity? An 
Analysis of One of the Core Objectives of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215 
(2017). (noting the connection between market integrity and fairness in the context of securities 
regulation); and Harry McVea, Supporting Market Integrity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 631, 635 (Eilis Ferran et al. eds., Oxford handbooks in law, 2015). 
(identifying the activities that threat market integrity and pose relevant regulatory challenges). 
172 See Dodd-Frank Act supra note 49 § 1001 enumerating consumer protection among its 
central objectives. Some commentators consider the protection of retail customers as a policy 
objective with a separate standing; see, e.g., Eilís Ferran et al., Introduction, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 1, 6 (Eilis Ferran et al. eds., Oxford handbooks in law, 
2015). However, the protection of customers, including investors in the retail segment of financial 
markets, is ultimately a matter of market integrity; see, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness 
of Financial Intermediaries, 86 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 1, 13 (1976). (noting that misconduct 
“prevents capital suppliers [such as depositors, investors, shareholders] from knowing fully the risks 
actually posed by a firm, and thus may prevent markets from working perfectly”). The Department 
of Justice established in 2018 the Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud, with purpose 
of “combating fraud against consumers […] and corporate fraud that victimizes the general public 
and the government” as noted by Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks 
Announcing the Establishment of the Task Force on Market Integrity and Consumer Fraud, DOJ 
(July 11, 2018), available at <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-
rosenstein-delivers-remarks-announcing-establishment-task> (accessed March 2020). 
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conduct regulation.173 Second, financial regulation is concerned with maintaining 
the safety of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system 
considered in its entirety.174 The former aim is achieved through micro-prudential 
regulation;175 the latter, instead, is attained through macro-prudential regulatory 
policies.176 
The debate regarding the policy aims of IP law has burned passionately for 
centuries.177 For copyright, one view has long been that the policy aim of this 
commercial law branch is to grant authors absolute control over their creations 
because they are figments of their “personality” (personhood theory).178 A different 
thesis has posited that the policy aim of copyright is to afford authors the just reward 
for their creative labor (Lockean labour theory).179 A third view, increasingly 
prevalent, is that the policy aim of copyright is to offer a market driven incentive 
to stimulate the ingenuity of authors, as the proliferation of creative works 
 
173 For a definition of conduct regulation and its relationship with “compliance culture” see 
supra 51-52 and accompanying text. 
174 See Dodd-Frank Act supra note 49 § 112 (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to maintain the stability of the United States financial system). Albeit commonly 
recognized as one of the central policy aims of financial regulation, financial stability is an elusive 
notion better understood as a condition where instability is absent; see generally William A. Allen 
& Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
152 (2006). (noting that financial stability is a state where episodes of instability are less likely to 
occur). Hence, the maintenance of financial stability results in limiting the occurrence and impact 
of systemic risk, defined as “a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an 
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the real economy;” see International Monetary Fund (IMF) et al., Guidance to 
Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations (Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, IMF, BIS, 
FSB), Oct. 2009 2.; on the regulatory approaches to systemic risk see supra n 55 an accompanying 
text.  
175 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
176 On the distinction between micro- and macro-prudential regulation see supra n 53 and 
accompanying text.  
177 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-10 (2011) 
(for a rich bibliography and a broad overview of the scholarly debate on the nature and justifications 
of intellectual property law); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 
287 (1988) (for an exhaustive account of the theories underlying IP law). 
178 See Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1039 (2019) (explaining the philosophical roots of this theory and its application to copyright law 
theory); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998) (for an analysis of this theory). 
179 See Hughes, supra note 177, at 296–310 (fanalyzing Locke’s property theory and its 
application to copyright law); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–55 (1993). 
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augments social welfare (utilitarian theory).180 For patent law, utilitarian theories 
have progressively garnered the favor of lawmakers, judges and commentators. The 
prevailing view is that the policy aim of this IP law strand is to incentivize the 
development, realization, and marketing of inventions for the economic and 
societal welfare that they generate.181 Other theoretical justifications based on 
natural rights,182 prospect theory,183 and social justice,184 have not gained 
comparable traction. Looking to trademarks law, in 19th century, the generally 
accepted view was that the policy aim of this system of rules and principles was to 
safeguard producers from competitors’ attempts to misappropriate their clientele 
with confusing and deceptive trade signs. In the 20th century, lawmakers, courts and 
commentators have progressively shifted to a utilitarian stance. They have 
embraced the theory that the policy aim of trademarks law is to enhance the quality 
of information available to market participants, thereby reducing search costs and 
increasing both competition and economic efficiency.185 
 
180 Unequivocal proclamations are found in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 
(1834). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009) (for an exhaustive analysis); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). 
181 Famously, Abraham Lincoln described the US Patent system as adding “the fuel of 
interest to the fire of genius” LECTURE ON DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS (1858). See Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (embracing an utilitarian theory of patent law); see 
generally Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 993–94 (1997) (for a detailed explanation and an exhaustive bibliography); Alan Devlin 
& Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 897, 897–99 (2009–2010); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent 
Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 181–84 
(2009). 
182 See Mossoff, supra note 38. 
183 See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
& ECON. 265 (1977). 
184 See generally Peter S. Menell, Property, Intellectual Property, and Social Justice: 
Mapping the Next Frontier Property as a Form of Governance: Panel 4: Property Rights in the 
Digital Age, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 147 (2016). 
185 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (stating that 
trademark law reduces the customers’ costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, while 
assuring producers reputational rewards associated with a strong brand); Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., 
Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that trademarks lower consumer search costs, foster high quality production and impede free-riding); 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet 
Trademark in Transition: Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark 
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2. The Middle Sphere: Key Tenets 
In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the middle 
sphere exists between the core and the outer sphere. It comprises the dispositive 
rules and principles that articulate the legal framework necessary to realize the 
policy aims of a commercial law branch. These “key tenets”186 are generally 
embedded in statutory instruments but can also stem from case law. Though with 
different intensity, they typically possess three traits that are interconnected and 
mutually influencing. 
First, key tenets establish the rules and principles through which 
commercial law branches supplement or derogate general law or another 
commercial law branch.187 In the context of banking law and regulation, for 
instance, key tenets of prudential regimes are constructed upon legal rules defining 
the relationship between depositors and the banker. As originally stipulated in 
English common law and further clarified by a rich jurisprudence developed by the 
US Supreme Court,188 deposits are “nothing more or less than a promise to pay, 
from the bank to the depositor;”189 forming a contractual relationship that allows 
banks to deploy such deposits to conduct their business and earn profits.190 This 
legal characterization allows banks to perform their socio-economic function 
within the financial system.191 Coextensively, courts have long recognized that 
banking differs substantially from an “ordinary private business” because of its 
 
Law, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 214–17 (1990–1991); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
The Economics of Trademark Law Articles and Reports, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267–69 (1988).  
186 Throughout Part III the locution “key tenets” is used to indicate the rules and principles 
that fall withing the middle sphere of a commercial law branch. 
187 See supra subpart I.A. 
188 In Foley v. Hill, (1848) 2 HLC 28, 9 ER 1002, Lord Cottenham delivered what could 
arguably be considered one of the most quoted decisions in banking law and stated that: “[t]he 
money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of the banker, to 
do with it as he pleases; […] he is of course answerable for the amount […] to repay to the principal, 
when demanded, a sum equivalent to that paid” cfr supra n 60  at 1005-1006. For a comment to see 
CRANSTON ET AL., supra note 51, at 192. (noting that “the excessive attention given to the debtor-
creditor side of Foley v. Hill obscures the fact that the case had an important contractual basis” to 
explain why the depositor-banker relationship presents significant deviations from the traditional 
debt obligations). The contractual nature of the relationship emerges more clearly from US case 
law; see infra 189 and 190 and accompanying text. 
189 See Citizens Bank of Maryland v. David Strumpf 516 U.S. 16 (1995). 
190 See Bank of Marin v. England 385 US 99, 101 (1966) (indicating that “[t]he relationship 
of bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, founded upon contract”); see 15-5991 U.S. 
Reports 1 (2016) Shaw v. United States (2016) (stating “[w]hen a customer deposits funds, the bank 
ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds and consequently has the right to use the funds as a source 
of loans that help the bank earn profits”). 
191 See generally Merton & Bodie, supra note 166. 
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“public nature” that, in turn, demands for it to be “properly subject to the police 
power of the state.”192 By holding a portion of the capital raised and converting 
most into means of production,193 banks deploy deposits (liquid debts with no fixed 
maturity) to support the creation of loans (illiquid assets with long-term 
maturity).194 Yet, unlike other debtor-creditor relationship, the power to receive 
deposits and extend loans is conferred by a special set of rules regulating nationally 
chartered banks.195  
In this schema, a principal-agent problem surfaces, whereby the banker 
(agent) tends to maximize returns from investing the money of depositors 
(principals) in order to increase profits.196 Corporate structures and compensation 
mechanisms, may incentivize this behavior leading bankers to take excessive risk 
or disfavoring prudent risk-management.197 As depositors are exposed to potential 
losses without having the power to monitor the conduct of the banker, a problem of 
moral hazard emerges.198 To maximize the value of the firm, bank managers and 
shareholders are incentivized to take more risk than what would be optimal from 
the standpoint of social welfare and, thus, compromising safety and soundness 
 
192 Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911). 
193 See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 54, at 66; and ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 68, at 
277. 
194 From an aggregate perspective, each time a loan is extended, a corresponding deposit is 
created; therefore, loans generate deposits that, in turn, are the primary form of purchasing power; 
see Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 70 (indicating that liquidity and maturity transformation 
are key functions to support the creation of credit and purchasing power in the modern economic 
system). On the function of deposits as a particular form of debt see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 
54, at 67. 
195 See National Bank Act 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (traditional banking powers also 
include discounting and negotiating promissory notes, and “loaning money on personal security”). 
196 On the principal-agent problem in general see the seminal work Sanford J. Grossman & 
Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).  
197 Mechanisms to compensate managers for short-term results are typically considered to 
heighten the principal-agent problem, see  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-
Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010). The debate is particularly lively in the context 
of bonuses accorded to managers; for an exhaustive analysis of the problem and its regulatory 
approaches see Andreas Kokkinis, Exploring the Effects of the ‘Bonus Cap’ Rule: The Impact of 
Remuneration Structure on Risk-Taking by Bank Managers, 19 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 
STUDIES 167 (2019). 
198 In economic theory, moral hazard is inherent to principal-agent relationships and it is 
defined as a problem of “hidden actions,” given that the action of the agent cannot be observed and 
contracted upon by the principal; see Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 74, 74 (1979). 
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aims.199 The key tenets of prudential regulation are, thus, designed to address the 
misalignment of incentives between bankers and depositors. They depart from 
general rules; for instance, by introducing the principle of “stakeholders’ 
supremacy”,200 by indicating that remuneration structure should support a sound 
risk-management,201 or by establishing coefficient and formulas to determine the 
amount of own funds that a bank must maintain for each given risk exposure.202  
The resulting regulatory framework supplement contract and corporate law rules to 
address moral hazard, by ensuring that banks have some “skin in the game”,203 and 
achieve stated policy aims. 
The second trait, closely linked to the first, is that key tenets articulate the 
fundamental concepts and doctrines of their appertaining system. For example, in 
secured transactions law, they govern the central aspects of creation, perfection, 
priority and enforcement of security interests. Regarding the former, under Article 
9, one such key tenet postulates that a person may create a security interest that 
encumbers one or all their present and future assets (floating lien),204 and secures 
any or all present or future obligations owed to a creditor.205 Similarly, across IP 
laws, key tenets dictate the cardinal elements of the legal framework governing 
subject matter, protection requirements, scope of protection, alienability and 
 
199 On the threats that governance mechanisms might pose to the safety and soundness of 
firms and markets see John E. Thanassoulis & Misa Tanaka, Bankers’ Pay and Excessive Risk, 
BANK OF ENGLAND, STAFF WORKING PAPER NO 1 (Staff Working Paper, 2015); Emilios Avgouleas 
& Jay Cullen, Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of 
a Symbiotic Relationship, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2014) (highlighting the connection between 
bank’s corporate governance, managers’ 201 mechanisms and financial stability). 
200 For financial firms, the principle of “shareholders’ supremacy” – arguably, a key tenet 
of corporate law – is often superseded by the principle of “stakeholders’ supremacy”. In banking, 
this principle is enshrined in international standards, see, notably, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) Corporate Governance Principles for Banks, 3 (2015) (stating that “with 
respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors’ interest”). 
201 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 
17, 2009) in 31 C.F.R. para 30.16(b)(1) (limiting the compensation attributed to executives, and 
other highly paid persons, of firms that received public assistance); for a comparative analysis of 
different regulatory approaches see Kokkinis, supra note 197. 
202 On key function of capital requirements see Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 71. 
(indicating that “that capital requirements control the quantity of credit circulating in the economy 
by binding its creation to an amount of equity that is proportionate to the level of risk acquired by 
each bank.”). For a detailed analysis of these mechanisms, see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 54, at 
238 et seq.  
203 Prudential regimes are designed both to limit excessive risk-taking and to enhance the 
loss-absorption capacity of banks; see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 54, at 504–74; ARMOUR ET 
AL., supra note 68, at 290–315. 
204 U.C.C. § 9-204. See HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 8, at 39–43. 
205 U.C.C. § 9-204(c). See GILMORE, supra note 32, at 917–18. 
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enforcement. For example, key tenets of the Lanham Act provide that trademarks 
holders have the exclusive right to “use in commerce” their registered “mark” and 
censure any person who causes a likelihood of confusion,206 dilution,207 
cybersquats208 or engages in false advertising.209 
The third trait is that key tenets are typically expressed at high level of 
generality and abstraction. Notable examples are: the general obligation to perform 
and enforce contracts in good faith established by the UCC,210 the “rule of reason” 
in antitrust law,211 the requirement that “works of authorship”212 must be 
“original”213 to be protected by copyright, and the obligations of financial 
immediacies to act in the “best interest of clients”.214 This “vague” and “open-
textured” nature has several advantages for key tenets, in light of their function 
within commercial law branches. As observed by Endicott and Spence, it “(i) 
allows the application of the standard to correspond to its purpose, without the 
 
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
207 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
208 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
209 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
210 U.C.C. § 1-304. See Robert S. Summers et al., The Conceptualization of Good Faith in 
American Contract Law, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 299 (Robert S. Summers et al. eds., Law and 
Philosophy Library, 2000) (for an extensive bibliography); Andrea Tosato, Commercial Agency and 
the Duty to Act in Good Faith, 36 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 661 (2016) (for an EU law 
perspective). 
211 The antitrust body of scholarship of the rule of reason is vast. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81 (2018) (for an exhaustive analysis).  
212 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (2000). US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. only mentions “writings”, yet this 
word has been given a broad interpretation; see The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (in 
which the Supreme Court explore the notion of “writings” stating it “may be liberally construed”); 
Goldstein v California, 412 US 546, 561 (1973) (“any physical rendering of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor”). 
213 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (“originality” is 
the very “premise of copyright law”). Menell, supra note 184, at 894–1334.  
214 The duty of acting in the best interest of clients has been traditionally defined in the 
context of investment-advisory relationships; see, notably, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc 375 U.S. 180 (1963); for a cogent analysis see See Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
1051, 1053 (2011). (noting that “the SEC and the courts have constructed a towering regulatory 
edifice” to establish fiduciary duties on advisers). Internationally, the duty to pursue the best interest 
of clients is enshrined in Principle 2 of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), International Conduct of Business Principles (1990). For a comparative perspective see 
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gargantini, The Expanding Boundaries of MiFID’s Duty to Act in the 
Client’s Best Interest: The Italian Case, 3 486 (2017). (noting that, the duty to act in the best interest 
of clients originated in the U.K. and, only subsequently was absorbed in the IOSCO principles and 
in the European Union).  
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arbitrariness of precision,215 (ii) enables the regulation of activities that simply 
cannot be regulated with precision, and (iii) can be a useful technique for allocating 
decision-making power and encouraging forms of private ordering that promote the 
purposes of the law.”216 
 
3. The Outer Sphere: Operative Propositions 
In our concentric systemization of commercial law branches, the outer 
sphere encircles the middle sphere and forms the outmost layer of the entire 
structure. It comprises rules and principles that build upon the concepts and 
doctrines forged by the underlying key tenets. Albeit in varying measure, these 
“operative propositions”217 have a narrow scope and govern their subject matter 
with a high level of determinacy. They are generally enshrined in statutory 
instruments and delegated administrative enactments, yet they can also stem from 
judicial decisions. This outer sphere is residual in nature, containing all the rules 
and principles of a commercial law branch that fall neither in the core nor in the 
middle sphere. 
The legal framework governing transfers of patents offers an illustrative 
example of both the nature of operative propositions and their dialogue with key 
tenets. Under the Patents Act, key tenets state that “patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property” and expressly recognizes that they can be assigned, licensed 
and mortgaged; moreover they also state that third party effectiveness of such 
transactions is conditional on their recordation in the special registry held by the 
US Patent and Trademarks Office (patent registry).218 Operative provisions flesh 
out the framework articulated by these key tenets, by establishing form 
requirements for these dealings, default and mandatary rules affecting their 
substance, and a public notice regime for their third party. Specifically, operative 
provisions in the Patent Act provide that alienations must be in writing and signed; 
furthermore, they specify which information needs to be recorded in the patents 
registry and the process that must be followed.219 
 
215 See Diver, supra note 13; Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 13, at 856. (noting that a 
principle-based approach “leads policymakers to assess their decisions against a set of design criteria 
that form the basis of reaching preferred policy outcomes.”). 
216 Timothy AO Endicott & Michael J. Spence, Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121 
L. Q. REV. 657, 665 (2005). 
217 Throughout Part III the locution “operative proposition” is used to indicate the rules and 
principles that fall within the outer sphere of a commercial branch. 
218 35 U.S.C § 261.  
219 37 C.F.R. §§3.11-3.28 (2019). 
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Similarly, in financial regulation, an example of operative provisions in the 
outer sphere is furnished by the rules that have a direct applicability in the 
compliance framework of financial institutions. Know Your Customer (KYC) rules 
– requiring financial institutions to collect, monitor, audit, and analyze relevant 
information about customers and potential customers – offer a good illustration of 
the mechanics characterizing operative proposition. KYC requirements, by 
imposing firms to performs a due diligence on clients, are key to the realization of 
market integrity objectives.220 Together with the customer due diligence regime 
(CDD),221 they define a rule-based regime regulating the processes that financial 
intermediaries must follow to pursue the best interest of their clients (key tenet) 
and, thus, instill confidence in the financial system (policy aim). 
 
B. The Second Step: Fostering legal coherence 
Our suggested systemization of commercial law branches has shown that 
CLIs can be viewed as the junctures at which the spheres of intersecting commercial 
law branches come into contact. Observed in this light, coordination failures are the 
result of gaps and incongruences between policy aims, key tenets and operative 
propositions belonging to different commercial law branches. Equipped with this 
understanding, the second step of our method turns its attention to fostering legal 
coherence. 
 
220 KYC is designed to prevent that the proceedings deriving from illicit activities are 
channeled into the financial system; see, e.g., the requirement to verify the identity of account 
holders in the PATRIOT Act § 326, Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272, 298-320; and the reporting 
requirements established with the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-4 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). For an overview 
of KYC rules in the U.S., see Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer - Or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 319, 
325–26 (2011–2012). (noting how the need to codify KYC rules became more urgent to address 
emerging societal concerns, such as drug trafficking and terrorist activities). At the international 
level, see Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering, and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, The FATF Recommendations (2012 
and updated in 2019) (Recommendation 10, in particular is on customers due diligence). 
221 Financial institutions are required to “understand the nature and purpose of the customer 
relationship in order to develop a customer risk profile,” in addition to performing “ongoing 
monitoring for the purpose of identifying and reporting suspicious transactions.” See The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Bank Secrecy Act - Customer Due Diligence and Beneficial 
Ownership Examination Procedures, Financial Institution Letter (FIL-26-2018), at p. 2. Available 
at <https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2018/fil18026a.pdf> (Accessed March 2020). The 
juxtaposition of anti-money laundering and risk-management goals indicates that regulators tend 
towards a broader understanding of KYC rules, albeit commentators prefer to consider CDD a 
distinct set of rules; see, e.g., SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 54, at 1262–64. 
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Below we break down CLI coordination failures into two broad categories. 
The differentiating factor is whether or not a core sphere is involved. This division 
reflects our view that the path to legal coherence – in terms of the assessments to 
be conducted, the consideration to be pondered and the range of possible solutions 
to be adopted – varies markedly if the CLI coordination failure in question involves 
the policy aims of one the intersecting branches. 
 
1. Coordination Failures involving Policy Aims 
The first category comprises coordination failures that involve policy aims. 
There are two types of such failures: “multi-core” and “single-core”.  
Multi-core CLI coordination failures are characterized by gaps or 
incongruences that stem from tension between the core spheres of two or more of 
the converging branches. Notably, though it is unlikely that commercial law 
branches with fundamentally conflicting policy aims will develop and co-exist 
within a single legal order, frictions may arise within circumscribed facets of their 
scope of application. 
One such example is provided by the overlap between antitrust law and 
insurance law in the context of disaster risk financing.222 Specifically, co-insurance 
arrangements may generate tensions between the specific socio-economic policy 
aim to expand the capacity of private insurers to absorb losses generated by large-
scale hazards, and that of antitrust law to protect competition by preventing 
unreasonable restraints of trade.223  
When faced with CLI coordination failures of this nature, fostering legal 
coherence will require particularly delicate interventions. There are in fact two 
possible scenarios that may materialize.  
 
222 Disaster risk financing encompasses a variety of risk-sharing arrangements involving 
public institutions and private (non-state) actors, including and in particular financial institutions; 
for an overview of these arrangements in the context of catastrophic losses that are generate by 
natural hazards see Giuliano G. Castellano, Governing Ignorance: Emerging Catastrophic Risks-
Industry Responses and Policy Frictions, 35 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 391 (2010); 
Alberto Monti, Climate Change and Weather-Related Disasters: What Role for Insurance, 
Reinsurance and Financial Sectors, 15 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST JOURNAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 151 (2009). 
223 The problem affects different jurisdictions in different ways; see Castellano, supra note 
222, at 408–10. (noting that a strict application of antitrust law might block the development of a 
market for first-party property insurance covering disaster risks). In the U.S., McCarran-Ferguson 
Act of 1945 reserves regulation of insurance business to the states, thus largely exempting the 
insurance industry from federal antitrust law; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2018). However, 
incongruences between the due regulatory system and disaster risk financing remain; see 
Christopher C. French, Dual Regulation of Insurance, 64 VILL. L. REV. 47, 64–65 (2019). (noting, 
for instance, that states cannot impose specific coverages, including those for “natural disasters”).  
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In the first, grievances between the core spheres of two or more intersecting 
branches will be symptomatic of an overt incompatibility between their 
underpinning social, economic, and political objectives. Here, the path to legal 
coherence will necessitate a prioritization of the policy aims of one branch over 
those of another. Such policy trade-offs are commonplace in a variety of domains. 
Administrative agencies are often mandated to balance competing objectives;224 
notably, in the context of financial regulation, this is often necessary when stability, 
competitiveness,225 and innovation226 are pursued simultaneously. The crucial 
normative decision will be to determine precisely the extent to which certain policy 
aims should be favored over others. For this assessment recourse to technical 
factors, cost-benefit analyses, risk-assessments, or broader considerations 
regarding societal preferences will be inevitable.  
In the second scenario, discord between the core spheres of intersecting 
branches in question will not be the product of overt incompatibility between their 
underpinning social, economic, and political objectives. In such instances, it might 
be possible to attain legal coherence within the CLI through interventions that 
mitigate and de-escalate their points of friction. Here, achieving equilibrium and 
alignment between the policy objectives at play would be the preferable 
outcome.227  
Single-core CLI coordination failures are characterized by gaps or 
incongruences that stem from tension between the policy aims of one commercial 
branch and the key tenets or the operative provisions of another. When grappling 
with such CLI coordination failures, two elements identified in our preceding 
analysis should be borne in mind. First, the purpose of a CLI is a function of the 
core of each one of the intersecting branches involved.228 Second, policy aims have 
the utmost systemic relevance in shaping their appertaining commercial law 
branch.229 Accordingly, if the policy aims of one commercial law branch are 
 
224 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 68, at 52. (noting that in financial regulation conflicts 
between objectives are not uncommon and to resolve them preferences among policy aims should 
be clearly defined). 
225 On the balance between financial stability and competition policies in the banking sector 
see generally Allen N. Berger et al., Bank Competition and Financial Stability, 35 J FINANC SERV 
RES 99 (2009). 
226 On the trade-offs that FinTech engenders towards market integrity and financial 
innovation, see Brummer & Yadav, supra note 14, at 242. (arguing that “when seeking to (i) provide 
clear rules, (ii) maintain market integrity, and (iii) encourage financial innovation, regulators can 
achieve, at best, two out of these three objectives”). 
227 For an example of such interventions see BARAK, supra note 16, at 363–70. 
228 See supra subpart II.C. 
229 See supra section III.A.1  
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hindered or negated in a CLI due to tension with key tenets or operative proposition 
of another intersecting branch, this will likely produce profoundly detrimental 
effects both in the CLI and the affected branch. This observation lends robust 
support to the view that, where a coordination failure arises because of tension 
between the core of one branch and the middle or the outer spheres of the other, 
interventions aimed at fostering legal coherence should presumptively seek to 
prioritize the former. Nevertheless, given that spheres are not separated by hard 
borders and the elements composing the core evolve over time, such prioritization 
demands caution. In particular, care must be taken to ensure that interventions that 
favor the policy aims of one branch over the key tenets or operative propositions of 
another should never go so far as to compromise the policy aims of the latter. 
The history of the CLI that emerges between antitrust law and patent law in 
“cross-licensing arrangements”230 among competitors offers an illustrative 
example.231 These transactions spark tension between the policy aims of antitrust 
law (ie. preventing competitors from entering into anticompetitive arrangements) 
and key tenets of patent law (i.e. the right of patent holder to freely license their 
patents).232 Between the 60s and 90s, there was ambiguity regarding the extent to 
which firms operating in the same markets could enter into patent cross-licensing. 
Such arrangements were positively permitted under patent law, but also attracted 
the scrutiny of antitrust law.233 Following this phase of uncertainty caused by gaps 
in the applicable law, the solution adopted by most jurisdictions has been to carry 
out progressively a multiplicity of legislative and regulatory interventions that have 
gradually prioritize antitrust concerns.234 The reasoning supporting this choice was 
that the potential detrimental impact to competition law by patent cross-licensing 
agreements far exceeded the harm that would ensue to patent-holders if their rights 
to license were mildly curtailed. 
 
230 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 467, 531–36 (2015) (defining patent cross-licensing arrangements as “situations in which 
product-producing firms agree to share technologies for some part of their production without 
fixing product prices or dividing the product market). 
231 See 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2D ED. 2010 & SUPP. 2014) §§ 34.2a-4.2b 
(for an exhaustive analysis of this topic). 
232 See Hovenkamp, supra note 230, at 532 (expounding all the scenarios in which cross-
licensing agreements create tension with antitrust policies). 
233 The literature and case law are exhaustively covered in 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra 
note 234, § 34; Id. at 533–35. 
234 For the US perspective, see 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 234, § 34; Id.. For an 
EU perspective see  DEVDATTA MALSHE, PATENT POOLS, COMPETITION LAW AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY ch. 4 (2018). 
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2. Coordination Failures Not Involving Policy Aims  
The second category comprises coordination failures that do not involve 
policy aims. There two types of such failures: “different-sphere failures” and 
“same-sphere failures”.  
Different-sphere failures are characterized by gaps or incongruences that 
stem from tensions between the middle sphere of one of the intersecting branches 
and the outer sphere of the other. When addressing coordination failures of this 
nature, a path to legal coherence similar to that suggested above for single-core 
failure should be followed. Specifically, it should be borne in mind that key tenets 
articulate the fundamental concepts and doctrines of their appertaining commercial 
law branch,235 and they establish the rules and principles through which commercial 
law branches express their exceptional and supplemental nature.236 This suggests 
that where a coordination failure arises because of tension between the middle 
sphere of one commercial branch and the outer sphere of another, interventions 
aimed at fostering legal coherence should presumptively prioritize the application 
of key tenets over the intersecting operative provisions. 
An example of the negative consequences that can occur when operative 
provisions are carelessly prioritized over key tenets was provided in subpart II.A. 
There, we discussed the CLI between secured transactions law and copyright law 
which materializes when this intellectual property right is used as collateral.237 We 
noted that the application the lex superior canon of construction results in the 
prioritization of copyright law operative provisions (i.e. the Copryright Registry 
recordation regime for transfers) over key tenets of secured transactions law (i.e. 
the perfection regime of Article 9).238 The resulting regime positively hinders the 
use of copyright as collateral: it prevents parties from relying on the efficient Article 
9 regime and forces them instead to follow the rules of Copyright law, which are 
ill-suited to for secured transactions.239 
Differently, same-sphere failures feature gaps or incongruences caused by 
a conflict or tension between rules and principles that both belong either to the 
middle sphere or the outer sphere of the intersecting branches. These two cases 
present similarities as well as dissimilarities. They are similar in that they involve 
 
235 See supra subsection III.A.2 
236 See supra subsection III.A.2 
237 See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.  
238 See supra note 116-118 and accompanying text. 
239 This regime was criticized by Judge Kozinski as “burdensome” in National Peregrine, 
Inc. v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass’n, 116 B.R. at 202 n.10. Haemmerli, supra note 94, at 1694–
95 (providing scorching criticism of the regime resulting from the intersection between the 
Copyright Act and Article 9). 
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a contraposition between rules and principles belonging to spheres of the same type. 
They diverge in that the two cases under consideration generate challenges that 
differ in nature and intensity. When CLI coordination failures feature conflicts or 
tensions between key tenets, the rules and principles in play are cornerstones of 
their respective commercial law branch. By contrast, when operative provisions are 
involved the structural impact for the intersecting commercial branches is less 
profound. The combination of these characteristics weighs heavily against any 
intervention aimed at prioritizing one set of rules and principles over the other, as 
neither one has greater significance either in their appertaining branch or in the CLI 
in question.  
When a prioritization does not offer a viable solution, fostering legal 
coherence in the CLI must follow a different path. Specifically, its unity of purpose 
should be extrapolated from the policy aims of the intersecting branches. Resolving 
this type of coordination failure requires that rules and principles within the CLI 
are in alignment with the underpinning social, economic, and political objectives 
of all intersecting branches.240 Nonetheless, the available maneuvering space and 
the methods that can be deployed to ensure such co-existence of rules differ 
markedly, depending on the spheres involved and on the features of the rules and 
principles generating incongruences and gaps. Legal coherence between key tenets 
may often be achieved through interpretive interventions that take advantage of 
their open-texture and abstract nature.241 By contrast, rules with a narrower scope 
and greater determinacy might often necessitate legislative reform or regulatory 
interventions.242  
The CLI involving secured transactions law and prudential regulation offers 
an illustration of the method required to address coordination failures not involving 
policy aims. As discussed, loans that are collateralized with personal property may 
be treated in the same guise of unsecured credit under applicable capital 
requirements.243 The consequences of this incongruent treatment of secured credit 
are far-reaching, possibly distorting the incentive structure in the credit market.244 
Yet, this coordination failure does not entail conflicts or tensions between core 
spheres. An inclusive access to credit, promoted through secured transactions 
 
240 See supra II.C on the need for developing a purposive method to address CLI 
coordination failures. 
241 Albeit not a necessary condition, key tenets are typically expressed at high level of 
generality; see supra III.A.2; for some examples in this regard see notes 210-214. 
242 This is a direct consequence of the trade-offs between flexibility and determinacy; see 
supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 92 and 93 and related discussion in text. 
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law,245 presupposes and supports the safety and soundness of markets and 
institutions pursued by prudential regulation.246 Therefore, rules and principles 
pertaining to these different branches should co-exist within a CLI the purpose of 
which is to promote a “sound and inclusive access to credit”.247 Normatively, this 
understanding has powerful implications. First, approaches designed to limit the 
applicability of existing regulatory regimes  to secured lending should be avoided, 
as they would result in a de-regulatory action unduly compromising the internal 
consistency of capital regulation and, thus, frustrating their ability to reach stated 
policy aims.248 Second, coherence can only be attained through legislative and 
regulatory interventions that resolve incongruences by designing a system of rules 
and principles that coordinate the legal and the regulatory facets of secured 
credit.249 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have offered three contributions to the study of CLIs and 
their coordination failures. First, we have reviewed the factors that have driven the 
proliferation of convergences between commercial law branches, as well as the 
increase in the relevance of these overlaps for an expanding group of business 
actors. Moreover, we have delved into coordination failures, showing that their root 
 
245 See supra note 165 and related discussion in text.   
246 See supra notes 174-176 and related discussion in text. 
247 This guiding purpose reflects the combined application of the policy aims underlying 
the intersecting branches under consideration. Promoting simultaneously financial inclusion and 
stability policies has been recommended in Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 15, at 539. (indicating 
that a false dichotomy between this policy aims may hinder the design of approaches that foster their 
advancement). Crucially, this recommendation is reflected goal of the World Bank to promote the 
establishment of “a sound and inclusive credit ecosystem” when secured transactions and prudential 
regulation are implemented at the domestic level; see WBG Knowledge Guide supra n 11 at 31 and 
seq. 
248 On the notion of consistency see supra notes 106-109 and accompanying discussion in 
text. As noted, resolving CLI coordination failures through a method solely focused on preserving 
the consistency within one branch is likely to compromise the consistency of other intersecting 
branch(es); see supra note 118. 
249 See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory 
Dimension of Secured Transactions Law Reforms, 22 UNIF. LAW. REV. 663, 684 (2017). (noting 
that “a comprehensive regulatory strategy, rather than ad hoc interventions, is required to unlock the 
full potential of secured transactions law reforms.”); Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 1, at 64. 
(indicating that “coordination between secured transactions law and prudential regulation, 
particularly capital requirements, should be addressed at the highest level of the lawmaking 
process—notably, when international soft-laws are defined.”); see WBG Knowledge Guide supra n 
11 at 31 (stating that “[c]oordination between secured transactions law reforms and prudential 
regulation requires designing a jurisdiction-specific reform strategy”). 
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causes are gaps and incongruences in the law, the ultimate consequences of which 
are distortions in market incentives and increased transaction costs. 
Our second contribution has been to apply a legal theory lens to CLI 
coordination failures. This perspective has provided us with robust arguments in 
support of the thesis that legal coherence should be adopted as the guiding star to 
reconcile tensions between commercial law branches. To this end, attention should 
focus on the CLI in view of overcoming coordination failures by ensuring that the 
relevant rules and principles are consistent both with each other and their respective 
branches, and that such consistency is attained through a unity of purpose.  
Our third contribution has been to propose a two-step method to address 
CLI coordination failures. The first step suggests a systemization to identify 
precisely the intersecting rules and principles and appraise their systemic relevance 
within their appertaining commercial law branch. The second step expounds the 
assessments to be conducted, the factors to be weighed and the range of possible 
interventions that may be carried out to achieve legal coherence in the CLI under 
consideration. 
Considered collectively, these contributions intend to have a twofold 
impact. At the most basic level, we want to offer an analytical framework that the 
legal community can employ to identify transactions which involve CLIs, 
recognize the presence of coordination failures and appraise their severity.  
At a broader level, we aspire to spark a reasoned normative discussion. 
Scholars, judges and practitioners alike are too often seduced by the temptation of 
dealing with CLIs suffering from coordination superficially. In some cases, they 
intentionally choose not to engage with the relevant gap and incongruences. In 
others, they apodictically advocate that one of the commercial law branches 
involved in the intersection under consideration should prevail over the others, 
often motivated by partisan reasons of convenience. We posit that CLIs should be 
understood as systems of rules and logical deductions and that their coordination 
failures can only be conquered through the careful consideration of the underlying 
socio-economic policies and political objectives of the intersecting branches. 
 
